CHAPTER VI.
LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.
ARTICLE XLI.
A few Remarks on Logistics in General.
Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, on the contrary, is it a
general science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art of
war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate
collectively the different branches of staff duty,–that is to say, the
different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations
of the art?
These questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmly
convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, and
believe it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seems
already accurately classified. For my own part, I am persuaded that good
definitions lead to clear ideas; and I acknowledge some embarrassment in
answering these questions which seem so simple.
In the earlier editions of this work I followed the example of other
military writers, and called by the name of _logistics_ the details of
staff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service and
of special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. This
was the result of prejudices consecrated by time. The word _logistics_
is derived, as we know, from the title of the _major général des logìs_,
(translated in German by _Quartiermeister_,) an officer whose duty it
formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to the
marches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. Logistics was
then quite limited. But when war began to be waged without camps,
movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had more
extended functions. The chief of staff began to perform the duty of
transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant points
of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documents
for arranging plans of operations. The chief of staff was called to the
assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information of
them to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to
supervise their execution both in their _ensemble_ and in their minute
details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all the
operations of a campaign.
To be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a man
should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. If
the term _logistics_ includes all this, the two works of the Archduke
Charles, the voluminous treatises of Guibert, Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard,
and Ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incomplete
sketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than
the science of applying all possible military knowledge.
It appears from what has been said that the old term _logistics_ is
insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that the
real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made to
instruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should be
accurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with the
general principles of the art. Governments should take the precaution to
publish well-considered regulations, which should define all the duties
of staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as to
the best methods of performing these duties.
The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for their
government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adapted
to the old methods of carrying on war than the present. This is the only
work of the kind I have seen. There are, no doubt, others, both public
and secret; but I have no knowledge of their existence. Several
generals–as, for instance, Grimoard and Thiebaut–have prepared
manuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of France has issued
several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a
complete manual on the subject.
If it is agreed that the old _logistics_ had reference only to details
of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staff
officers at the present day are intimately connected with the most
important strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logistics
includes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if we
retain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended and
developed in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of
ordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief.
To convince my readers of this fact, I will mention the principal points
that must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty and
detail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakings
resulting from such movements:–
1. The preparation of all the material necessary for setting the
army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign.
Drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage
of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of
operations.
2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief
for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected
battles.
3. Arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the
measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be
used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to
facilitate the operations of the army.
4. Ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and
procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as
possible of the positions and movements of the enemy.
5. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements
ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the different
columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner.
Ascertaining certainly that the means requisite for the ease and
safety of marches are prepared. Regulating the manner and time of
halts.
6. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards,
flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions
for their guidance. Providing all the means necessary for the
performance of their duties.
7. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or
their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing
up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as
their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to
engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the
character of the enemy.[33]
8. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen
points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and
informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of
need.
9. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage,
munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in
their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the
movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking
precautions for order and security, both on the march and when
trains are halted and parked.
10. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies.
Collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of
the army, and regulating their use.
11. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations
for their safety, good order, and police.
12. Establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies,
as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached
bodies. Designating officers capable of organizing and commanding
in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and
convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also
for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its
base.
13. Organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men,
movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their
safety.
14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the
flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking
out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on
detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some
center of action, and forming strategic reserves.
15. Organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up
isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction
between the army and its base of operations.
16. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of
the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of
artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those
troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults.
17. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving
order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard;
causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where
the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his
pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the
movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that
they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper
precautions to insure safety.
18. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps;
indicating to each principal division of the army a place of
assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders,
instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed.
An examination of this long list–which might easily be made much longer
by entering into greater detail–will lead every reader to remark that
these are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staff
officers. This truth I announced some time ago; and it is for the very
purpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attention
to the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be provided
with staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution.
Their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; and
woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! This
want of harmony is often seen,–first, because generals are men and have
faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individual
interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and
hindering them in performing their duties.[34]
It is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for the
guidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifarious
duties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staff
officers with different names and rounds of duties,–so that I should be
obliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, these
details are fully entered into in special books pertaining to these
subjects.
I will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some of
the first articles enumerated above:–
1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the army
to enter upon active operations in the field include all those which are
likely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. They
should, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, that
the _matériel_ of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses,
carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &c. should be carefully
examined and any deficiencies supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tool
trains, _matériel_ of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move,
ambulances,–in a word, every thing which conies under the head of
_matériel_,–should be carefully examined and placed in good order.
If the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers,
gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craft
should be collected at the points and at the bank where they will
probably be used. Intelligent officers should examine the most favorable
points both for embarkations and for landings,–preferring those
localities which present the greatest chances of success for a primary
establishment on the opposite bank.
The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be
necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to the
proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such direction
to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them any
thing relative to the projected enterprise.
If the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chief
engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base of
operations, when _têtes de ponts_ or intrenched camps are to be
constructed there. If the war is defensive, these works will be built
between the first line of defense and the second base.
2. An essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates to
making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by the
general and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs of
staff. The next most important qualification of a general, after that of
knowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating
the execution of his orders by their clearness of style. Whatever may be
the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a
commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if the
general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as he
can, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief.
I have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of the
service. The first, which may be styled the old school, consists in
issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, general
instructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so much
the more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps,
who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same
sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out of
school.
The other method is that of the detached orders given by Napoleon to
his marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself,
and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either on
the right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of the
operations of the whole army.[35] I have good reasons for knowing that
he did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air of
mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the hands
of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans.
It is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his plans
secret; and Frederick the Great was right when he said that if his
night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire.
That kind of secrecy was practicable in Frederick’s time, when his whole
army was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness of
Napoleon’s are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert of
action can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what is
going on around them?
Of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. A judicious mean
may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of Napoleon and the
minute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like Barclay,
Kleist, and Wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companies
and reforming again in line of battle,–a piece of nonsense all the more
ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of the
enemy is impracticable. It would be sufficient, I think, in such cases,
to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and to
add a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan of
the operations and the part they are to take individually in executing
it. When a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmitted
verbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating it
accurately. Indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and
concert of action would be secured.
3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to undertake some
enterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert and
precision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usual
precaution’s to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursue
and to cover its movements thoroughly.
There are two kinds of marches,–those which are made out of sight of
the enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing or
retiring. These marches particularly have undergone great changes in
late years. Formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they had
been several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party had
roads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to each
other. At present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existing
roads usually answer all purposes. It is, however, of importance, when
an army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced
guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove
obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c., if necessary, and
secure the means of easy communication between the different corps of
the army.
In the present manner of marching, the calculation of times and
distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a different
distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure and
giving them instructions the following particulars must be
considered:–1, the distances to be passed over; 2, the amount of
_matériel_ in each train; 3, the nature of the country; 4, the obstacles
placed in the way by the enemy; 5, the fact whether or not it is
important for the march to be concealed or open.
Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arranging
the movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of all
those corps not marching with the column attached to the general
head-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of the
generals commanding those corps,–being careful, however, to let them
understand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It will
then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the
object to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour at which
they will be expected to be in position. They should be informed what
corps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roads
to the right or left in order that they may govern themselves
accordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of the
enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them.[36]
All those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for the
chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them in
position are mere pedantry,–more hurtful than useful. To see that they
march habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; but
they should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at the
appointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from their
command if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. In retreats,
however, which are made along a single road by an army separated into
divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated.
Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its
march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenient
also, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of each
column to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools
for removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few of
these workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a light
trestle-bridge train will be found very useful.
4. The army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard,
or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wing
may have its special advanced guard. It is customary for the reserves
and the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advanced
guard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so that
half the army is thus assembled on the central route. Under these
circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the
road. It happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to be
made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the
general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved
in that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating the
march of the center must be applied to that wing.
Advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable of
forming correct ideas as to the enemy’s movements and of giving an
accurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make his
plans understandingly. The commander of the advanced guard should assist
the general in the same way. A general advanced guard should be composed
of light troops of all arms, containing some of the _élite_ troops of
the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some
horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c., with light trestles and
pontoons for passing small streams. A few good marksmen will not be out
of place. A topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketch
of the country a mile or two on each side of the road. A body of
irregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regular
cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to such
service.
5. As the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomes
the more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots which
may keep up the connection of the army with its base. The staff officers
will divide the depots into departments, the principal depot being
established in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest number
of men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selected
as the site of the principal depot.
The secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen to
thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. The mean distance
apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. This will give fifteen
depots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided into
three or four brigades of depots. Each of these will have a commander
and a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the
arrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to the
authorities of the country, (if they remain;) they furnish facilities
for transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander sees
that the roads and bridges are kept in good order. If possible, there
should be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at the
principal one in each brigade. The command of all the depots embraced
within certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and
able general officers; for the security of the communications of the
army often depends on their operations.[37] These commands may sometimes
become strategic reserves, as was explained in Art. XXIII.; a few good
battalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passing
continually between the army and the base, will generally be able to
keep open the communications.
6. The study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, to
be taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order of
march to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requires
going into such minute detail that I must pass it over nearly in
silence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerous
works specially devoted to this branch of the art of war.
Before leaving this interesting subject, I think a few examples should
be given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system of
logistics. One of these examples is the wonderful concentration of the
French army in the plains of Gera in 1806; another is the entrance of
the army upon the campaign of 1815.
In each of these cases Napoleon possessed the ability to make such
arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated,
were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point of
the zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issue
of the campaign. The choice of the decisive point was the result of a
skillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements
for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originated
in his own closet. It has been long claimed that Berthier framed those
instructions which were conceived with so much precision and usually
transmitted with so much clearness; but I have had frequent
opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. The emperor was
his own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened to
a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight
line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into
account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched
at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the
supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors,
he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and
precision which were astonishing. Turning his dividers about from point
to point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marches
necessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by a
certain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing in
mind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and the
hour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone
enough to make any man famous.
Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia,
Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and
Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were all
thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously
between Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or in
Germany having any conception of the object of these movements which
seemed so very complicated.
In the same manner, in 1815, when Blücher had his army quietly in
cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington was
attending _fêtes_ in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of
France, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed
with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been
but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon
Charleroi and Blücher’s quarters, his columns arriving from all points
of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the
plains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not
leave Paris until the 12th.)
The combinations described above were the results of wise strategic
calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of
logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures,
I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics
came very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having been
recalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria’s taking up arms, and
being certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier into
Bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was
extended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was
returning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had
been on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the Strasbourg
route; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were moving from their
respective countries. The corps were thus separated by great distances,
and the Austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break
through this spider’s web or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justly
uneasy, and ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war
had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it
in a more retired position toward Ulm.
The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war had begun,
Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a point of assembly, as
the corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundred
thousand enemies; but by fixing upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous the
army would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have
five or six marches more to make before reaching-it,–which was a
highly-important consideration as the parties were then situated.
No great talent was needed to understand this. Hostilities having
commenced, however, but a few days after Berthier’s arrival at Munich,
this too celebrated chief of staff was so foolish as to adhere to a
literal obedience of the order he had received, without conceiving its
obvious intention: he not only desired the army to assemble at Ratisbon,
but even obliged Davoust to return toward that city, when that marshal
had had the good sense to fall back from Amberg toward Ingolstadt.
Napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph of the
passage of the Inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence, came with the
speed of lightning to Abensberg, just as Davoust was on the point of
being surrounded and his army cut in two or scattered by a mass of one
hundred and eighty thousand enemies. We know how wonderfully Napoleon
succeeded in rallying his army, and what victories he gained on the
glorious days of Abensberg, Siegberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon,
that repaired the faults committed by his chief of staff with his
contemptible logistics.
We shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the events which
preceded and were simultaneous with the passage of the Danube before the
battle of Wagram. The measures taken to bring to a specified point of
the island of Lobau the corps of the Viceroy of Italy from Hungary, that
of Marmont from Styria, that of Bernadotte from Linz, are less wonderful
than the famous imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated
the details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the plains
of Enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty thousand Austrians
and five hundred cannon, as if the operation had been a military _fête_.
These masses were all assembled upon the island on the evening of the
4th of July; three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of the
Danube one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidst
torrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over the
bridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up before
mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which they
covered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less time
than might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuver
for instruction and after being several times repeated. The enemy had,
it is true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage;
but Napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositions
is not at all diminished by it.
Singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made ten
copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridge
of the center had been assigned to Davoust, who had the right wing,
whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to Oudinot, who was in the
center. These two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not
been for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene
of confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the supineness of the
enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few
detachments following corps to which they did not belong. The most
remarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact that
after such a blunder Berthier should have received the title of Prince
of Wagram.
The error doubtless originated with Napoleon while dictating his decree;
but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made ten
copies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation of
the troops?
Another no less extraordinary example of the importance of good
logistics was afforded at the battle of Leipsic. In fighting this
battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at Leipsic, and in the
midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, it
was highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare the
banks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. These
precautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but
they would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well
as the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder
and of there being no roads of escape. The unaccountable blowing up of
the bridge of Lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessness
upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name,
owing to the manner of Berthier’s management of it. We must also agree
that Napoleon, who was perfectly conversant with the logistical measures
of an offensive campaign, had then never seriously thought what would
be proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the emperor was
present himself no one thought of making any arrangement for the future
unless by his direction.
To complete what I proposed when I commenced this article, it becomes
necessary for me to add some remarks with reference to reconnoissances.
They are of two kinds: the first are entirely topographical and
statistical, and their object is to gain a knowledge of a country, its
accidents of ground, its roads, defiles, bridges, &c., and to learn its
resources and means of every kind. At the present day, when the sciences
of geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced state,
these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly; but they are
still very useful, and it is not probable that the statistics of any
country will ever be so accurate that they may be entirely dispensed
with. There are many excellent books of instruction as to the art of
making these reconnoissances, and I must direct the attention of my
readers to them.
Reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is necessary to
gain information of the movements of the enemy. They are made by
detachments of greater or less strength. If the enemy is drawn up in
battle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs of staff make the
reconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole divisions of cavalry may be
thrown out to break through his screen of posts.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 33: I refer here to general instructions and forms, which are
not to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.]
[Footnote 34: The chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the
administrative departments all claim to have direct connection with the
general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. There should, of
course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high
officers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence of
the chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise,
confusion is inevitable.]
[Footnote 35: I believe that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram,
and at the opening of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated
from his usual custom by issuing a general order.]
[Footnote 36: Napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no
general should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten.
In many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is often
indispensable.]
[Footnote 37: It may be objected that in some wars, as where the
population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to
organize lines of depots. In such cases they will certainly be exposed
to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are most
necessary and should be most numerous. The line from Bayonne to Madrid
was such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of the
guerrillas,--although convoys were sometimes seized. At one time the
line extended as far as Cadiz.]
ARTICLE XLII.
Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining Correct Information of
the Movements of the Enemy.
One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to
order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy’s
proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if
he is ignorant what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of
the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the
utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is one of the
chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice
of war.
From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simply
learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquired
that practical _coup-d’oeil_ which is imparted by long experience in the
direction of military operations. It is a very easy matter for a
school-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a line
of communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of
both parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful,
active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect
riddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of the
incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius.
I have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life, that, if I had
to put a general to the test, I should have a much higher regard for the
man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy
than for him who could make a grand display of theories,–things so
difficult to put in practice, but so easily understood when once
exemplified.
There are four means of obtaining information of the enemy’s operations.
The first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists in
reconnoissances made by skillful officers and light troops; the third,
in questioning prisoners of war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses of
probabilities. This last idea I will enlarge upon farther on. There is
also a fifth method,–that of signals. Although this is used rather for
indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions as to
his designs, it may be classed with the others.
Spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any other
agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy’s camps; for
reconnoissances, however well made, can give no information of any thing
beyond the line of the advanced guard. I do not mean to say that they
should not be resorted to, for we must use every means of gaining
information; but I do say that their results are small and not to be
depended upon. Reports of prisoners are often useful, but it is
generally dangerous to credit them. A skillful chief of staff will
always be able to select intelligent officers who can so frame their
questions as to elicit important information from prisoners and
deserters.
The partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy’s lines of
operations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it is
almost impossible to communicate with them and receive the information
they possess. An extensive system of espionage will generally be
successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the
general’s closet and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best for
him, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with his
own eyes or hears from reliable persons. Even when the general receives
from his spies information of movements, he still knows nothing of those
which may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going finally
to attempt. Suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passed
through Jena toward Weimar, and that another has passed through Gera
toward Naumburg: he must still ask himself the questions, Where are they
going, and what enterprise are they engaged in? These things the most
skillful spy cannot learn.
When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the
enemy’s operations was certain, because reconnoitering-parties could be
thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report
accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into
corps d’armée which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to
learn any thing about them. Spies may, however, be very useful when the
hostile army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign who
always moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves. Such, for
example, were the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon. If it was known when
they moved and what route they followed, it was not difficult to
conclude what project was in view, and the details of the movements of
smaller bodies needed not to be attended to particularly.
A skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by making
reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. I can with great satisfaction
say that this means hardly ever failed me. Though fortune never placed
me at the head of an army, I have been chief of staff to nearly a
hundred thousand men, and have been many times called into the councils
of the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question under
consideration was the proper direction to give to the combined armies of
Europe; and I was never more than two or three times mistaken in my
hypotheses and in my manner of solving the difficulties they offered. As
I have said before, I have constantly noticed that, as an army can
operate only upon the center or one extremity of its front of
operations, there are seldom more than three or four suppositions that
can possibly be made. A mind fully convinced of these truths and
conversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a plan
which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the
future. I will cite a few examples which have come under my own
observation.
In 1806, when people in France were still uncertain as to the war with
Prussia, I wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the war and the
operations which would take place.
I made the three following hypotheses:–1st. The Prussians will await
Napoleon’s attack behind the Elbe, and will fight on the defensive as
far as the Oder, in expectation of aid from Russia and Austria; 2d. Or
they will advance upon the Saale, resting their left upon the frontier
of Bohemia and defending the passes of the mountains of Franconia; 3d.
Or else, expecting the French by the great Mayence road, they will
advance imprudently to Erfurt.
I do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless the
Prussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their forces,
already inferior to the French, upon the two directions of Wesel and
Mayence,–a useless mistake, since there had not been a French soldier
on the first of these roads since the Seven Years’ War.
These hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one should ask
what course Napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to reply “that the
mass of the French army being already assembled in Bavaria, it should be
thrown upon the left of the Prussians by way of Grera and Hof, for the
gordian knot of the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan
they should adopt.”
If they advanced to Erfurt, he could move to Gera, cut their line of
retreat, and press them back along the Lower Elbe to the North Sea. If
they rested upon the Saale, he could attack their left by way of Hof and
Gera, defeat them partially, and reach Berlin before them by way of
Leipsic. If they stood fast behind the Elbe, he must still attack them
by way of Gera and Hof.
Since Napoleon’s direction of operations was so clearly fixed, what
mattered it to him to know the details of their movements? Being certain
of the correctness of these principles, I did not hesitate to announce,
_a month before the war_, that Napoleon would attempt just what he did,
and that if the Prussians passed the Saale battles would take place at
Jena and Naumburg!
I relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for if that
were my motive I might mention many more of a similar character. I have
only been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may be often
arranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art, without
much attention being of necessity given to the details of the enemy’s
movements.
Returning to our subject, I must state that the use of spies has been
neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies. In 1813 the
staff of Prince Schwarzenberg had not a single sou for expenditure for
such services, and the Emperor Alexander was obliged to furnish the
staff officers with funds from his own private purse to enable them to
send agents into Lusatia for the purpose of finding out Napoleon’s
whereabouts. General Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806,
were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often suffered
severely, because it was impossible to obtain spies and to get
information as to what was going on around them.
The Russian army is better provided than any other for gathering
information, by the use of roving bodies of Cossacks; and history
confirms my assertion.
The expedition of Prince Koudacheff, who was sent after the battle of
Dresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who crossed the Elbe by swimming
and marched in the midst of the French columns as far, nearly, as
Wittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. The information
furnished by the partisan troops of Generals Czernicheff, Benkendorf,
Davidoff, and Seslawin was exceedingly valuable. We may recollect it was
through a dispatch from Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa,
intercepted near Châlons by the Cossacks, that the allies were informed
of the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with his
whole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified towns
of Lorraine and Alsace. This highly-important piece of information
decided Blücher and Schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies,
which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought
to act in concert except at Leipsic and Brienne.
We know, also, that the warning given by Seslawin to General Doctoroff
saved him from being crushed at Borovsk by Napoleon, who had just left
Moscow in retreat with his whole army. Doctoroff did not at first credit
this news,–which so irritated Seslawin that he effected the capture of
a French officer and several soldiers of the guard from the French
bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. This warning, which
decided the march of Koutousoff to Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleon
from taking the way by Kalouga, where he would have found greater
facilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous
days of Krasnoi and the Beresina. The catastrophe which befell him would
thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented.
Such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what good
partisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers.
I will conclude this article with the following summary:–
1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the
enemy’s movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of
reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable
officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners.
2. By multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matter
how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be
sifted from them.
3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means.
4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods
mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses
of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative
situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of
the principles of the art.
I can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing very
unexpected can befall him and cause his ruin,–as has so often happened
to others; for, unless he is totally unfit to command an army, he should
at least be able to form reasonable suppositions as to what the enemy is
going to do, and fix for himself a certain line of conduct to suit each
of these hypotheses.[38] It cannot be too much insisted upon that the
real secret of military genius consists in the ability to make these
reasonable suppositions in any case; and, although their number is
always small, it is wonderful how much this highly-useful means of
regulating one’s conduct is neglected.
In order to make this article complete, I must state what is to be
gained by using a system of signals. Of these there are several kinds.
Telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most important of all.
Napoleon owes his astonishing success at Ratisbon, in 1809, to the fact
of his having established a telegraphic communication between the
head-quarters of the army and France. He was still at Paris when the
Austrian army crossed the Inn at Braunau with the intention of invading
Bavaria and breaking through his line of cantonments. Informed, in
twenty-four hours, of what was passing at a distance of seven hundred
miles, he threw himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later he
had gained two victories under the walls of Ratisbon. Without the
telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. This single fact is
sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value.
It has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. Such a telegraphic
arrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on high ground, could
communicate the orders of the center to the extremities of a line of
battle, as well as the reports of the wings to the head-quarters.
Repeated trials of it were made in Russia; but the project was given
up,–for what reason, however, I have not been able to learn. These
communications could only be very brief, and in misty weather the method
could not be depended upon. A vocabulary for such purposes could be
reduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented by
signs. I think it a method by no means useless, even if it should be
necessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers capable of
transmitting them with accuracy. There would certainly be a gain of
rapidity.[39] attempt of another kind was made in 1794, at the battle of
Fleurus, where General Jourdan made use of the services of a balloonist
to observe and give notice of the movements of the Austrians. I am not
aware that he found the method a very useful one, as it was not again
used; but it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him the
victory: of this, however, I have great doubts.
It is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in readiness
to make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his making careful
observations upon what is going on below, whilst floating at the mercy
of the winds above, has led to the abandonment of this method of gaining
information. By giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up with
it an officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy’s
movements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in connection
with the balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from its
use. Sometimes the smoke of the battle, and the difficulty of
distinguishing the columns, that look like liliputians, so as to know to
which party they belong, will make the reports of the balloonists very
unreliable. For example, a balloonist would have been greatly
embarrassed in deciding, at the battle of Waterloo, whether it was
Grouchy or Blücher who was seen coming up by the Saint-Lambert road; but
this uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much mixed.
I had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from such observations
when I was stationed in the spire of Gautsch, at the battle of Leipsic;
and Prince Schwarzenberg’s aid-de-camp, whom I had conducted to the same
point, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the prince was
prevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between the Pleisse and the
Elster. An observer is doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower than
in a frail basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always at
hand in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported at
pleasure.
There is still another method of signaling, by the use of large fires
kindled upon elevated points of the country. Before the invention of the
telegraph, they afforded the means of transmitting the news of an
invasion from one end of the country to the other. The Swiss have made
use of them to call the militia to arms. They have been also used to
give the alarm to winter quarters and to assemble the troops more
rapidly. The signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged so
as to indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy’s
threatening movements and the point where they should concentrate to
meet him. These signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice of
descents.
Finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an action, by
means of military instruments. This method of signals has been brought
to greater perfection in the Russian army than in any other I know of.
While I am aware of the great importance of discovering a sure method of
setting in motion simultaneously a large mass of troops at the will of
the commander, I am convinced that it must be a long time before the
problem is solved. Signals with instruments are of little use except for
skirmishers. A movement of a long line of troops may be made nearly
simultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point and passed rapidly
from man to man; but these shouts seem generally to be a sort of
inspiration, and are seldom the result of an order. I have seen but two
cases of it in thirteen campaigns.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 38: I shall be accused, I suppose, of saying that no event in
war can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. To prove
the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite the
surprises of Cremona, Berg-op-zoom, and Hochkirch. I am still of the
opinion, however, that such events even as these might always have been
anticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits of
probability or possibility.]
[Footnote 39: When the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not
known.--Translators.]
