CHAPTER IV.
GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.
Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great
questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to
the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance,
the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and
fortune, gains victories.
Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to
battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in
tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of
the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that
point the possession of which promises the most important results.
Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding
features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have
been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched
battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that
a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same
character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations.
The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which
are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the
order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the
plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details,
the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers
subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the
proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm,
superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and
the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as
well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and
their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting
that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot
result in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a few
brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish
before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his
position. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the
maneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805.
As is evident from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to discourage
the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of
it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and
opportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general’s
design to make himself master of his enemy’s communications while at the
same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than
tactical combinations to accomplish it.
There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or those
fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy’s
attack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in
position; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the
collision of two armies meeting on the march. We will examine in
succession the different combinations they present.
ARTICLE XXX.
Positions and Defensive Battles.
When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line
of battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of this
work, it will appear that I make a distinction between _lines of battle_
and _orders of battle_,–things which have been constantly confounded. I
will designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied by
battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will
take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will
await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is
the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical
intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully
explained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate as an
_order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to
execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the
oblique order, the perpendicular order.
This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper
distinction between two things which should by no means be
confounded.[22] From the nature of the two things, it is evident that
the _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements;
because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will
be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of
battle. _Order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of
troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some
maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to
offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that the
line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of
troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a
position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or
any other. I refer above only to ordinary cases.
Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of
positions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a
favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for the
purpose of there fighting a defensive battle. Such a position may be
taken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, such
as a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls
the surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege.
There are two kinds of positions,–the _strategic_, which has been
discussed in Article XX., and the _tactical_. The latter, again, are
subdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied
to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected,–in a
word, intrenched camps. Their relations to strategic operations have
been treated in Article XXVII., and their attack and defense are
discussed in Article XXXV. Secondly, we have positions naturally strong,
where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days’ time. Third
and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the
defensive. The characteristics to be sought in these positions vary
according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance
not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too
extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep
and difficult of access,–quite suitable places, probably, for temporary
camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of this
kind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of
access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it,
should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops
forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles
presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy
than for the assailed. For example, it is certain that Massena, in
taking the strong position of the Albis, would have made a great error
if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was
exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the same reason,
Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a
good choice of position at Waterloo, where all the avenues of approach
were well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover,
rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a
battle-ground.
The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are
the following:–
1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it
easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to
approach the line of battle.
2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense.
3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of
troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point
deemed the proper one.
4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy’s movements.
5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat.
6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or
artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon
their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or
at least some point of the front.
This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on
a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest
reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the
broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed
to afford perfect protection. This danger–about which there can be
no doubt–gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy
defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable
obstacles.[23]
7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by
throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a
crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may
cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of
the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind
the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the
required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground
must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full
details on this point are given in the description of the battle of
Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years’ War.)
8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the
flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other
points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack
upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most
advantageous for defense,–as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo.
Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest
accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the
insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack
Wellington’s center, instead of the left as he had been ordered.
When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to
hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in
order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining
idle spectators of it.
The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but
palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is
to _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_.
Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been
mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us
to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo.
Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road
behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as
Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that
such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely
open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure
to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a
portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would,
in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great
part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain.
There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a
forest,–this statement being made upon the supposition that there are
at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for
retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press
too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank
movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest,
as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if,
as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the center; for
this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and
give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads.
When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying
chances which the two systems, the _defensive_ and the _offensive_, give
rise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the
initiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and
striking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon
the defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, is
often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements by
those of the enemy. We have also seen that in tactics these advantages
are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller
extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his
movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once
counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. Moreover, the party
advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising
from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile
line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always
inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges,
farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or
be passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy’s
batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a
greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire
either of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of
these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages
resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages.
However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more
manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history.
Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if
attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by
all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to
take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest
success. A general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping
strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give
way when properly attacked. It is not so, however, with a general who
indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall
upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and
transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward
movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength
into the action at the most important point,–a thing altogether
impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact, a general
who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has
the advantage of observing the enemy’s approach; his forces, previously
arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries
placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very
dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and
when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly
assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the
advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral
effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed
to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops.
A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success
either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,–1st,
that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know
how to take the offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his
_coup-d’oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able
to rely surely upon his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, he
should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would
have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; 5th,
that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths are
demonstrated by Napoleon’s course at Rivoli and Austerlitz, as well as
by Wellington’s at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at Waterloo.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 22: It is from no desire to make innovations that I have
modified old terms or made new. In the development of a science, it is
wrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if
we continue to apply the term _order of battle_ to the disposition of
troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important
maneuvers by the terms _oblique order of battle_, _concave order of
battle_, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms _oblique
system of battle_, &c.
I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The _order of battle_
on paper may take the name _plan of organization_, and the ordinary
formation of troops upon the ground will then be called _line of
battle_.]
[Footnote 23: The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and
the rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the
famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the Danube,
in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps be said that
the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but,
throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that the
difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not
be insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. At Elchingen
the great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost
ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.]
ARTICLE XXXI.
Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle.
We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when
assaulting another in position.[24] An army reduced to the strategic
defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army
receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the
offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. History furnishes
numerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. As defensive
battles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages
of the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to the
consideration of offensive movements.
It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage
over the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the
latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty.
As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack
must be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to be called
_order of battle_.
It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without
a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely
known. In either case it should be well understood that there is in
every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than
of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to
make a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements should
therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point.
The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already
stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different
localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the
arrangement of the contending forces. For example, suppose an enemy’s
flank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might be
attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically
considered; but it may happen that the height in question is very
difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least
importance, strategically considered. At the battle of Bautzen the left
of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia, which province
was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically
considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be
held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line
of retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing the
right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and
throw the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all
their _matériel_ and a great part of the personnel of their army. This
course was also easier for them on account of the difference in the
features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have
diminished the obstacles in the future.
The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated:
1. The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical
key; 2. The decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which
combines strategic with topographical advantages; 3. When the
difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic
point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point;
4. It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends
very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in lines
of battle too much extended and divided the center will always be the
proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is
the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there,
it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in this
case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numerical
superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon
both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior
numerically to the enemy’s. It appears, therefore, that all the
combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to
obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points
mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success,–a
point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned.
The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or
to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin
his army completely. An enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at
some point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank
and rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him
in front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line
turned.
To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make
choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used.
At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: 1. The simple
parallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive or offensive
crotchet; 3. The order reinforced upon one or both wings; 4. The order
reinforced in the center; 5. The simple oblique order, or the oblique
reinforced on the attacking wing; 6 and 7. The perpendicular order on
one or both wings; 8. The concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. The
order by echelon on one or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on the
center; 12. The order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the
center and one extremity simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16.)
[Illustration: Fig. 5.[25]
A TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
____________________________|____________________________ B ]
Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been
stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to
turn the enemy’s line. In order to a proper appreciation of the merits
of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the
general principles which have been laid down. For example, it is
manifest that the parallel order (Fig. 5) is worst of all, for it
requires no skill to fight one line against another, battalion against
battalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tactical
skill is needed in such a battle.
There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order,
which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great
strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy’s
communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its
own; when the battle takes place between them, that army which has
reached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having
effected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts
should now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy’s endeavor to
open a way through for himself. Except for this single case, the
parallel order is the worst of all. I do not mean to say that a battle
cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other must
gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage will
then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when to
engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored by
fortune.
[Illustration: Fig. 6.
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A | |B
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B
]
The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (Fig. 6) is most
usually adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of an
offensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in
the case of defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a very
remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if
properly attacked.
[Illustration: Fig. 7.
A
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____|___
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B ____|___
]
The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (Fig. 7,) or upon the
center, (Fig. 8, page 190,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more
favorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in
accordance with the general principles which have been laid down;
although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of the
line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its own
safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy.
[Illustration: Fig. 8.
A
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________|________
_________________
B _________________
]
[Illustration: Fig. 9.]
The oblique order (Fig. 9) is the best for an inferior force attacking a
superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main
strength of the forces against a single point of the enemy’s line, it
has two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not only
kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double
duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of
being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged
wing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas at the battles
of Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of its use in modern
times was given by Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. (See
Chapter VII. of Treatise on Grand Operations.)
[Illustration: Fig. 10.
C |
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/ |
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C |
B-|
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[Illustration: Fig. 11.
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|-B B-|
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]
The perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in Figs. 10 and
11, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction
along which the primary tactical movements might be made in a battle.
Two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions
indicated in these figures; for if the army B were to take its first
position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the army
A, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line;
and even the army B, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the
extremity of A, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right
or the left, in order to bring them near the enemy’s line, and so take
him in reverse, as at C, the result being two oblique lines, as shown in
Fig. 10. The inference is that one division of the assailing army would
take a position perpendicular to the enemy’s wing, whilst the remainder
of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; and
this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown in
Figures 9 and 16.
The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be
very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very
decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is to
bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker
army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior
force. This truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on.
[Illustration: Fig. 12.]
The order concave in the center (Fig. 12) has found advocates since the
day when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cannæ. This order may
indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to
it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him,
and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. But, if this order
is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on
the center, has only to attack the wings, which present their
extremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they
had been assailed in flank. This order would, therefore, be scarcely
ever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order to
fight a battle, as will be seen farther on.
[Illustration: Fig. 12, _bis_.]
An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line
with the center retired, (Fig. 12, _bis_.) If several writers may be
believed, such an arrangement gave the victory to the English on the
famous days of Crécy and Agincourt. This order is certainly better than
a semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack,
whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all the
advantages of concentration of fire. These advantages vanish if the
enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is
content to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon
one wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the advantageous use of a
concave line; but it must not be inferred that Napoleon committed an
error in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the Danube
behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of
communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at
pleasure.
[Illustration: Fig. 13.]
The convex order with the center salient (Fig. 13) answers for an
engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must
be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a
defensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be
passed and the defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it may
become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If
an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a single
wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army.[26]
The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were successful, because
the Prince of Coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center
or upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six
diverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. Nearly the
same convex order was adopted at Essling, and during the second and
third days of the famous battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had
just the result that might have been expected.
[Illustration: Fig. 14
A
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_____ _____
_____ _____
_____ _____
_____ B _____
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]
The order by echelon upon the two wings Fig. 14 is of the same nature as
the perpendicular order, (Fig. 11,) being, however, better than that,
because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where
the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as
regards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the center
and make at that point a threatening counter-attack.
[Illustration: Fig. 15
A
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___|___
___|__ __|___
_____ _____
_____B B_____
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]
The order by echelon on the center (Fig. 15) may be used with special
success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too
extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the
wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be
probably destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamental
principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain of
success against an army having a connected and closed line; for the
reserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to act
either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost
echelons, might readily repulse them.
If this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge
or _boar’s head_ of the ancients, and the column of Winkelried, it also
differs from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid
mass,–an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of
artillery,–it would have a large open space in the middle, which would
render movements more easy. This formation is suitable, as has been
said, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and might
be equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if the
wings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against the
flanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result.
A parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be
a much better arrangement, (Figs. 8 and 16;) for the parallel line in
this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to
the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelons
of the center by the flank.
This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of the
intrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand Operations, chapter
xxviii.) In such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain
that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments,
there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, this
formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point
of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made
upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack.
[Illustration Fig 16.]
The order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the
same time (Fig. 16) is better than the preceding, especially in an
attack upon an enemy’s line strongly arranged and well connected. It may
even be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. The
attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents
the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank,
as was done by Hannibal and Marshal Saxe. The enemy’s wing which is
hemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, having
to contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated and
probably destroyed. It was this maneuver which gave Napoleon his
victories of Wagram and Ligny. This was what he wished to attempt at
Borodino,–where he obtained only a partial success, on account of the
heroic conduct of the Russian left and the division of Paskevitch in the
famous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of Baggavout’s
corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. He used it also at
Bautzen,–where an unprecedented success would have been the result, but
for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing
intended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, every
arrangement having been made with that view.
It should be observed that these different orders are not to be
understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general
who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon
paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be
likely to suffer defeat. This is particularly true as battles are now
fought. In the time of Louis XIV. or of Frederick, it was possible to
form lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures,
because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collected
together, and were in presence of each other several days, thus giving
ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns
to be at regular distances from each other. But in our day,–when armies
bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility,
when they take position near each other in obedience to orders given
them while out of reach of the general’s eye, and often when there has
been no time for thorough examination of the enemy’s position,–finally,
when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of
battle,–under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be
laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. These figures
have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate
arrangements.
If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the
influence of one man’s will and as rapidly as thought, the art of
winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of
battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of
maneuvers arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different;
for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to
render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous
fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give
good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is
to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive
maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is
to result in victory.
Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be
understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief,
excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective
_coup-d’oeil militaire_,–every thing of this kind may interfere with
the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without
speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the
arrival of a corps at the appointed place.
Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive
maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers
seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than
those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to
previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to
decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the
expected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the
moment when Blücher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont,
nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and
they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like
manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of the
allies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them,
for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had executed better what
he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one.
As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the
co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army,
with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy’s flank,
it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends
upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely
seen. This subject will be considered in Art. XXXII.
Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an
order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin
without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the
collision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either from
circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy’s
position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be
still expected to arrive on the field.
From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to
reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that
the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an
engagement,–an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases
cited above. Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it
is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy
lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the
party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm
will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to
be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts
to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack
shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed
against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once.
Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a
resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even in
unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,–which will, it is
hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the
different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless.
There is nothing even in Napoleon’s battles which disproves my
assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being
represented by lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, at
Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward
the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy.
At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. At
Leipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used a kind of convex order very like
Fig. 11. At Wagram his order was altogether like Fig. 16, bringing up
two masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing;
and this he wished to repeat at Borodino and at Waterloo before the
Prussians came up. At Eylau, although the collision was almost entirely
unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensive
movement of the Russians, he outflanked their left almost
perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to break
through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on the
center being repulsed at eleven o’clock, whilst Davoust did not attack
vigorously upon the left until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by the
two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center
was covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition,
the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the
enemy’s line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself,
the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole, saved
him from almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won by
strategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do with
them. At Ulm there was not even a regular battle.
I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark
out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be
used in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless
bear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may so
combine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be
similar to one of them. He should endeavor in all his combinations,
whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to
form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battle-field;
and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy’s
line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy
requires him to operate. He will then give his attention and efforts to
this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or
watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point
the possession of which will insure him the victory. Acting thus, he
will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can
impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the
most perfect manner. The manner of determining the decisive point of a
battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (Art. XIX.)
Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me
that this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in
the Memoirs of Napoleon published by General Montholon.
The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern
invention, a theorist’s fancy,–an opinion I can by no means share; for
the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it
used with my own eyes. This assertion of Napoleon’s seems the more
remarkable because Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo,
the very order of which he thus denies the existence.
If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid
and precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the Berlin school.
Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but I
repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and
when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it
can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by
the use of a known symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line of
battle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy’s must
be oblique of necessity. If one army attacks the extremity of another
army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon it
while the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction of
the line must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of it
will be nearer the enemy than the other. The oblique order is so far
from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that by
echelons on one wing, (Fig. 14.)
As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied
that at Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the Austrians was
a concave line, and that of the French a convex. In these orders
parallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and they
would be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part of
the line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than
another.
Laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical
figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles
in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attended
to:–
1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to force
the enemy from his position by all reasonable means.
2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm
one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. An
enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and
turning his position.
3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success if
concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault.
4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without
having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the
rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very
strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points.
5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least
half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing,
while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of
attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique
line.
6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or
otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform
strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point.
7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the
attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be
such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position,
and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to
fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least
expect to meet it.
8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method
to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order
of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of
the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset.
A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting
alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good
combination. In the practical use of this system many variations
must arise from differences in the _coup-d’oeil_ of commanders, the
_morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers
and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c.
9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy
from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best
means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can
be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the
direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better
results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing
which is nearest the enemy’s line of retreat. He may when thus
threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if
attacked by main force.
History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers,
especially when used against generals of weak character; and,
although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and
the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete
successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a
skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them
when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these
turning movements with attacks by main force.
10. The combination of these two methods–that is to say, the
attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver–will render
the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but,
in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in
presence of a contemptible enemy.
11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force
is the following:–Throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and
well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by
vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus
gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front
by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry.
But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the
first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that,
the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking
party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral
effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat
of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence
of mind. In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat
disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to
replace them by those of the second line, because they generally
follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within
musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to
substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the
moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in
repelling the attack.
These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the
troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance
of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks
and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually
be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to
insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be
launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the
proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable,
and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first.
12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth:
“that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the
means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in
strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second
line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of
masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the
decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is
presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of
battles.”
In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain
guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never
compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient
substitute for that intuitive _coup-d’oeil_ imparted by experience
in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness.
The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all
arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be
always held in hand,[27] will, therefore, at the critical moment of
the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will
attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention.
This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties
is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put
forth,–on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to
wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to
make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous
attack upon the enemy’s flank would be very advantageous.
13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more
effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to
be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and
marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as
skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. The
object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the
troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry
will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the
enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part
of the cavalry must be launched against him. There will then be a
strong probability of his repulse.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 24: In every battle one party must be the assailant and the
other assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and
defensive for the other.]
[Footnote 25: The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve
orders indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are
represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the
figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle
ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of
attack, in squares, or checkerwise.]
[Footnote 26: An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in
some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the
enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a rule, a
false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one
extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.]
[Footnote 27: The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when
it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final
reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau
decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what
Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader of
history.]
ARTICLE XXXII.
Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles.
We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn
an enemy’s line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may
be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide
détours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of
so many plans seemingly well arranged.
It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which
is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking
place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless,
as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d’oeil_
of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which
he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many
maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded
against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous
in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire
success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to
take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself
have been in the habit of moving in this manner.
It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject.
The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the
force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful,
however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies.
A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any
thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and
seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be
more daring.
A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of
the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these
extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the
armies concerned in them.
In the Seven Years’ War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because
the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards
between their right and the remainder of their army,–the latter part
remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was
the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter
distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had
to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick
was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.
On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau,
because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and
disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of
Marshal Daun.[28] Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric
movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose
line was thus reformed.
The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar
with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother
wished to surround Napoleon’s little army, which was concentrated on the
plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,–while their left was piled
up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making
a wide _détour_ to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was
speedily surrounded and captured.
No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the
unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of
sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight
thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst
Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to
pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of
sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these
divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their
rear. Saint-Cyr’s escape was indeed little less than a miracle.
We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired to
surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz,
in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of
the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon’s right, to cut him off
from Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement
of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their
line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and
surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes
Tellnitz and Melnitz.
Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to
Napoleon’s, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to
Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,–seeing
which, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no
support.
If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he
might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case
a total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty
thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be
unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper
advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way,
Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief
merit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d’oeil_. With the Duke of
York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been
successful.
Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo
and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was
almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare
concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will
search in vain in military history for another example of a single
brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies,
and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in
the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all
probability, to lay down his arms.
At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the
successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center
under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportune
assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have
been the result.
So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that
no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for
it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an
order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find
himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance;
but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his
enemy’s character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to
regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers
or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were
the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to
outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and
opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the
enemy’s front, either against the wing turned or against the center.
Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy’s line of communications
before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army
preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be
successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected
maneuver during the battle.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 28: For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and
XXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.]
ARTICLE XXXIII.
Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.
The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives
rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war.
In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a
position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as
close and accurate as possible. It often happens, however,–especially
as war is now carried on,–that two armies approach each other, each
intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision
ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it
does not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by another
which has prepared a surprise for it,–as happened to the French at
Rossbach.
A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a
skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. It is always
possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander
may not have great capacity; but victories like those of Lutzen,
Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius
endowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations.
There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no
means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the
very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the
fundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applying
them, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided
upon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms.
Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage,
and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause
their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they
are traversing. In each army the forces should at the same time be
concentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper direction
considering the object of the march. A grave error would be committed in
deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if the
deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a
badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced
guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of the
troops which were forming. (See the account of the battle of Rossbach,
Treatise on Grand Operations.)
In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon
several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently,
these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are
unchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then
the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best
suited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the
enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him.
ARTICLE XXXIV.
Of Surprises of Armies.
I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,–the chief
features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light
Russian and Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myself
to an examination of the surprise of whole armies.
Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected
than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are
heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to
an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten
and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known
because there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years’ War
presents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that
a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are
sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the
combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity
of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it
so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from
their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point
intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack.
As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march,
prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan
one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy’s
camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a
surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected
attack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in
1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his
imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but
there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his
own negligence.
It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to
fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of
the sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place;
and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can
give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his
forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events
occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although
it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which
renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought.
For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities
for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to
prevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of any
well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last.
ARTICLE XXXV.
Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps or
Lines.–Of Coups de Main in General.
There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses,
are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be
carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether
practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other
means of getting to the parapet.
The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations
as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups de
main_.
This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strength
of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they are
built; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, with
the morale of the respective parties. History gives us examples of all
of these varieties.
For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw,
the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch,
Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with
varying circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments were
better connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There was, in
fact, a _tête de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for
the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would
have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. At
Warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had
as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended
by a number of desperate men.
Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of
which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was
suited to a field-work. The camp proper was protected by simple
redoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep
giving it its sole strength.[29]
At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation;
but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at
Turin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant
parapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep.
In the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were
attacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene
assailed them from without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front,
only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the right
flank.
The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few
in number. If it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked
a little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if
this operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by
no means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp
will permit itself to be surprised,–especially as the regulations of
all services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. As an attack
by main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, the
following simple and reasonable directions are laid down:–
1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire,
which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the
defenders.
2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as
fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and
mount the parapet.
3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken,
skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their
support.
4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover
for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible.
5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their
duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of
attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies of
cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground
permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is nothing
more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as
actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the
gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most
daring rashness.
Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for
escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great
advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the
passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets.
Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read,
none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched
camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon’s dispositions
for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is
an excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited
as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal
Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to be
followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for
attacking Dresden in 1813.
Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or
escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,–both
preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in
neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault.
Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better
interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried,
because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost
impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point.
The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described
in the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,)
and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent
lessons for study.
This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is so
familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of
it; but I cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was
bought and how little it should have been expected. The strategic plan
was certainly admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza
to Asti by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio,
was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. When
we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that the victors
owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. It required no
great effort of genius upon the part of Prince Eugene to prepare the
order he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contempt
for his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied
troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on the
one side and the Alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for
forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever
attempted. The order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of
instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write a
better. Directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade
in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to make
openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, make
up the sum total of all the science exhibited by Eugene in order to
carry out his rash undertaking It is true he selected the weak point of
the intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the
bodies of its defenders.
But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation
of the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. If
they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by
assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by
strategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last
indicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. If, however, there is any
reason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one
of the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored.
There have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by the
defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at that
point, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeeded
simply because unexpected. In these operations the locality and the
character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to
be pursued.
The attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps.
It has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief
and proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be
quite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away
from the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of
moderate activity. The ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of this
character; so also was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch so
gloriously defended against Ney, because he preferred making his stand
at the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with
an inclination of scarcely thirty degrees.
If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think
of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces,
the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns
advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them.
This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the
enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive
return upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. A
general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half
conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them
when their intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I
cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk
and meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause of
complaint.
Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and
lines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between
the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of
the left wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangement
succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which
could not be done were there but one central reserve. It has been
suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment
is very extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two are
quite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of great
importance,–that the troops be made to understand they must by no means
despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point;
because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack
the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have
supposed in his power.
COUPS DE MAIN.
These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the
capture of posts of different strength or importance.[30] They partake
of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both
these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a
successful issue. Although _coups de main_ seem to be entirely tactical
operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the
captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. It will become
necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main
in Article XXXVI., when speaking of detachments. However tiresome these
repetitions may seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executing
such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack
of intrenchments.
I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these
operations; for their name, _coups de main_, implies that ordinary rules
are not applicable to them. I desire only to call attention to them, and
refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic,
where they are mentioned.
I have previously stated that important results may often follow from
these enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessful
attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprises
of Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814,
as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the
different kinds of _coup de main_. Some are effected by surprise, others
by open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the
assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things
which have an influence upon the successful issue of _coups de main_.
As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer
of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon
the results of a great strategic operation.
The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that
of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the
two attacks which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the
Grisons; the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally,
the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of
provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;–such are the
enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging
in them may be exposed.
Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with
fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the
same purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always be
prepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of
soldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the
intrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona by
Prince Eugene.
In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for
what has been done once may be done again.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 29: The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August
25) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the
third day, more than one hundred thousand.]
[Footnote 30: The distinction between the importance and the strength of
a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little
importance, and vice aversá.]
