CHAPTER III.
STRATEGY.
DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations,
consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics,
Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer.
We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them.
In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general
when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest
importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the
necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and
ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation
and handling of a great army.
We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its
commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the
character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war,
and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into
consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies.
The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone
of operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will
select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a
temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction;
namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable
opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of
operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. The
temporary positions which the corps d’armée will occupy upon this front
of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions.
When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet
resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel
him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic
lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain
degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be
confounded.
To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made,
lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established.
If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in
annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and
dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may
be carried on without reference to them. If the second of these courses
be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the
result.
The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the
enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will
be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective
point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective
point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be
commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after
detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a
strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which,
less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria,
leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty
thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul.
If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if
it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more
important objective point.
If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an
intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already
occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small
strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and
also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large
streams, it will construct _têtes de pont_; and, if the bridges are
within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the
means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the
strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.
Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in
order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is
equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts
and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces.
When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the
field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and
is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter
campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not
differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased
activity and energy to attain prompt success.
Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it,
while discussing combinations which result from these operations.
Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:–
1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the
different combinations of which it admits.
2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and
the most favorable direction for operations.
3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of
operations.
4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.
5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.
6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or
strategic front.
7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different
maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.
8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.
9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.
10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the
army.
11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army,
as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.
12. Points for intrenched camps, _tétes de pont,_ &c.
13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.
These points are principally of importance in the determination of the
first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed
nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises,
disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which
belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy.
The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different
formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is
the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches
and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the
execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.
To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and
comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of
posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the
ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the
ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may
extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics
comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of
strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings
the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution
and the employment of the troops.
It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements,
and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in
the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of
pitched battles the above definition holds good.
Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the
following objects:–
1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.
2. The offensive in a defensive battle.
3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the
attack of the enemy’s line.
4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.
5. Surprises of armies in the open field.
6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.
7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.
8. _Coups de main_.
All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties,
skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and
any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be
regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations.
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all
the operations of war,–a principle which must be followed in all good
combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:–
1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively,
upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the
communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising
one’s own.
2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of
one’s forces.
3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the
decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of
the first importance to overthrow.
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the
decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with
energy.
This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one
objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the
forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in
recognizing those points.
This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to
enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all
necessary explanations for its application upon the field. In Article
XIX. these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from
XVIII. to XXII. will be discussed their relations to the different
combinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what is
there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a
problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending
strategy.
The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three
zones,–the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of
operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each
line of battle, has the same subdivisions,–two extremities and the
center. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for
the attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two
remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be
wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connection
with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it
will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the
question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right,
to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three
simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of
giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of
strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive
talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary
to carry out any combinations previously arranged.
We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy
and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated
campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and
the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in
the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other.
OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.
ARTICLE XVI.
Of the System of Operations.
War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it
shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant
by these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a
great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is
attacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defense
of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally,
if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy’s position, and is
confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the
_initiative_. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly
always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the
assailant’s country from devastation, increases his resources and
diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, and
generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion
excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,–particularly when he
feels that the independence of his country is threatened.
In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad
side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations,
which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in
the enemy’s country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are
favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the
country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are
generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck
in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek
a speedy termination of the contest.
For a single operation, which we have called the taking the
_initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly
in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses
upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the
initiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what he
desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to
strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy
fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows
where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel
him.
Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less
positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party
taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect
his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail.
The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the
obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy’s line; on which
account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are
about equally balanced.
Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically
from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively
throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become
defensive before it ends.
A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It
may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive
defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes.
The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the
country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to
retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying
obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one’s own
army. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then
seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the
contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off
detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to
his progress.
An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive
inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or
artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying
obstacles in the way of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an
extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has
the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in
his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary;
he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon
the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of
the enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and
may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. It combines the
advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a
prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all
the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take
the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike.
During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years’ War Frederick was
the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of
the defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by
his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many
opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington’s course
was mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most
suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest
talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these
two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during
the progress of a defensive war.
ARTICLE XVII.
Of the Theater of Operations.
The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties
may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or
to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest.
When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both
hemispheres,–as has happened in contests between France and England
since the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined,
and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the
other army. The theater of a continental war between France and Austria
may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the
German States take part therein.
Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole
theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which
strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the
second case each army will have its own independent theater of
operations. The _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all the
territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to
defend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt any
maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in
danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of
action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields.
If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of
operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the
general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common
object.
Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one
or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:–
1. Of a fixed base of operations.
2. Of a principal objective point.
3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense.
4. Of zones and lines of operations.
5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications.
6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the
enemy.
7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important,
either for the offensive or defensive.
8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective
point and the primary base.
9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.
For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria
with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and
starting from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime
Alps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armies
traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of
operations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without
concerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a
zone becomes for that army a theater of operations.
In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective
point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point
with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive.
It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations
_par excellence._ Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to
move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line
of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of
maneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers are
excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment
of a good line of operations, but never the line itself.
It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly
to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because
they facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities
for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these
points must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a
desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an
individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and
the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover,
was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use
of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable for
defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial
lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are
pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses
separately.
Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in
strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary,
these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also
that if more rare they are more important and more decisive.
Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war,
inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the
Rhetian Alps, said that “an army could pass wherever a man could put his
foot.”
Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have
united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of
carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of
partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the
heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the
decisive points,–the junctions of the large valleys.
These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader
that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many
points that admit of discussion.
The most important topographical or artificial features which make up
the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be
examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to
remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the
general. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the
passage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of
these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and
a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo.
ARTICLE XVIII.
Bases of Operations.
A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army
obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it
takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which
it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively.
The base of operations is most generally that of supply,–though not
necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance,
a French army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia or
Franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine.
When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be
alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line
of defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always
be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its
own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a
vast difference between those parts of the country without military
positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those
other portions where these military resources are found; and these
latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army may
have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army in
Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have others
beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but
if it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the
Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth
upon the Loire.
These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the
first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may become
necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good
base on Béfort or Besançon, on Mézières or Sedan, as the Russian army
after the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and
established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces.
These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often
decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the
country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain
himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being
held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired.
The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in
covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from
it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so
favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more
retired.
A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of
sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There
should be a _tête de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams.
All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions
have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to
that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of
the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides
almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus
affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of
two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely
apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an
unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.
The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military
Operations:–
“The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a
great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and,
consequently, upon the direction of the bases.
[Illustration: Fig. 1.]
“If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more
or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign,
may hold one of these faces,–perhaps two,–while the enemy
occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable
obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead
to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the
theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and
that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1,
p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the
line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of
the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the
Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces,
the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for
them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four
faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The
French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of
operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B
D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines
of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could
communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine.
“The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He
occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle
and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented
by the side A B. The result is well known.
“The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them
such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without
losing one’s own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and the
bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications
with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo,
Ulm, and Jena.
“When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always
bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and
closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle
insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as
an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a
defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it.
The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and
fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with
impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none
the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of
war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed
in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached
the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the
frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make
it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in
Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has
control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of
establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided,
since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
shortened side,–as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806,
with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the
Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of
Franconia.”
[Illustration: Fig. 2.]
The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my
opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the
French army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense
advantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded
Napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor.
Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the
Oka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank march
upon Wiazma and Krasnoi.
If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only
be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of
the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of
operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications
and line of retreat.
It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable
in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may
object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in
favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against
double lines of operations with equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The
objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a
perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient,
which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the
other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should
be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be
sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies,
while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,–as was
done in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety
degrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and
thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another
perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by his
left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the
enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the
extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carried
him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisions
having already rejoined him.
In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main,
forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first
and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the
extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians
at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.
If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them
being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is
well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be
partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in
Article XX.
Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of
bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be
favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others,
as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always
exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of
the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be
favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day
praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of
Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of
Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all
the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not
only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible
line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.
Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras
secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes,
many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good
except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of
supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar
notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to
have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty
thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that
the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon
the front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all
its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the
base were established upon the coast.
An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a
diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle,
viz.: _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained
by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe
retreat._
A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea
adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty
or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its
supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of
one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a
disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.
However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it
may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when
your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master
of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior.
We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the
Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was
given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan
which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army
(even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.
Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon
the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army
covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and
Silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as
its base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously
would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer,
or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have
terminated with the first campaign.
Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own
frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or
temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy’s
country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they
will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in Article XXIII.
ARTICLE XIX.
Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and
Objective Points of Operations.
Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this
title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance:
these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value
from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the
hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against
them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally,
there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others
whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVE
strategic points.
Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance,
whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the
presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical
strategic point.
A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily
be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated
operation. I think differently; for a strategic point is such
essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from
the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by
some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. It
would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not
necessarily decisive points.
Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from
their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided
as follows,–viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance
belong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and those which
have value merely because they connect two strategic points.
To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in
their relations to maneuvers,–confining ourselves here to what relates
to the _decisive and objective points_ of the zone of operations upon
which enterprises occur.
Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective
point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater
of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all
decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations.
We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in
our selection of the second.
I think the name of _decisive strategic point_ should be given to all
those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the
result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose
geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor
the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense
are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy
in importance the first rank among them.
The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first
are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a
consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the
case of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the
Meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the
country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the
Meuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if
he give battle parallel to that sea.[8] Similarly, the valley of the
Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be
looked upon as the key of Southern Germany.
Those points the possession of which would give the control of the
junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of
communication in a country are also _decisive geographic points_. For
instance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the
valleys of the Rhone and Saône, and is at the center of communications
between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would
not be a _decisive_ point unless well fortified or possessing an
extended camp with _têtes de pont_. Leipsic is most certainly a
strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the
communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy
both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,–if
a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive
point.
All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are
not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and
government.
In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of
exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to
any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the
importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in
1800.
The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver,
which result from the positions of the troops on both sides.
When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army
through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth
or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was
cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to
support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same
position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and
from the army of Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon
him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since
this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of
retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base,
and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective
point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Mélas by the
Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence
Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reason
of the march of Mélas upon Nice.
It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of
maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent
operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting
forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to
the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of
forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the
case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although
dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet.
If the enemy’s forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the
decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be
more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed
separately.
The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,–
1. The features of the ground.
2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.
3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.
These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles.
OBJECTIVE POINTS.
There are two classes of objective points,–objective _points of
maneuver_, and _geographical objective points_. A geographical objective
point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of
operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support
for ulterior enterprises. _Objective points of maneuver_, in
contradistinction to _geographical objectives_, derive their importance
from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile
masses.
In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point.
If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the
hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy
to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the
objective point. However, the geographical position of the capital, the
political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their
respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the
art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of
operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to
occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital,
the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line
of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which
would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For
instance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the
first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the
second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the
objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain
possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, being
considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of
the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first
line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army
reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be
to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the
forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the
river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the
first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,–which might be
attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.
As to the objective points of _maneuvers_,–that is, those which relate
particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile
forces,–their importance may be seen by what has already been said. The
greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in
some degree in the good choice of these points. This was the most
conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were
satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of
an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of
accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile
army,–since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no
organized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the relative
advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to
concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best
promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate
position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his
center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which
he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut
his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his
forces,–such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first
campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very
best.
When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances
and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as
in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is
not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances
of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle.
Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real
advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they
are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of
the adjoining states.
The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are
almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and
in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines
of operations.
As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend
upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other
circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of
the two parties.
In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may
be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,–such
as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory.
In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success
by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the
hostile army, as did Napoleon.
The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose
only object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, they
could not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five
hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to
be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by
success.
There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are
determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they
play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and
plans of cabinets. They may be called _political objective points_.
Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in
its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are
undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but
often very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great
errors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the
Duke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the
operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their
failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. The
expedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799–likewise due to the
views of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on
Belgium–was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke
Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,–a step quite contrary to the
interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These
illustrations prove that political objective points should be
subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been
attained.
This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd
to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given
has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective
points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or
their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events
of the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will
be seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk
should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in
other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great
attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this
kind are generally included in grand diversions,–to be treated of in a
separate article.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 7: I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,--since a
line cannot be a _point_, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive
or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that _objective_
points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of
expression used to designate the object which an army desires to
attain.]
[Footnote 8: This only applies to continental armies, and not to the
English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothing
to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.]
ARTICLE XX.
Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic
Positions.
There are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble
each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently
confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. Such are _fronts of
operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense_, and _strategic
positions_. It is proposed in this article to show the distinction
between them and to expose their relations to each other.
FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS.
When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they
generally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the front occupied
toward the enemy is called the _strategic front_. The portion of the
theater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two
or three marches is called the _front of operations_.
The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to
confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other.
Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed
by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the
other embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or
two marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes
the ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision.
When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of
the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will
undertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the
strategic front or more to the rear. Hence the strategic front and line
of defense may coincide, as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon the
Rhine, which was then a line of defense for both Austrians and French,
and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. This
occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons to
confound them, while they are really very different. An army has not
necessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: when
its masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategic
front, but it is never without a front of operations.
The two following examples will illustrate the difference between the
different terms.
At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon’s front of operations
extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence it ran along the
line of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau, (his right being at
Löwenberg,) and followed along the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His
forces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose
strategic positions were interior and central and presented three
different faces. Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line
of defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend to
the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond the
strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended
his operations to these points.
The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front of
operations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to the
Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, between
Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, between
Peschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his
positions.
The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies,
and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of
operations. The strategic front will have the same direction, and ought
to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend
far enough on either flank to cover this line well. However, this
direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on
account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens
that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and
parallel to the original line of operations. Such a change of strategic
front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this
means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained,
thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a
base with two faces. (See Art. XVIII.)
The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these
points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made
the Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew,
from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka,
to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the
Baltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be
obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It
ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always
be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words,
that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and
should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allenstein
upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the front of the
army the _tête de pont_ of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communications
were safe, while Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line
parallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown
back upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another very
remarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon Jena
and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his right upon
Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and France, and thereby
forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm.
The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the
base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days’
duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by
important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive
blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good
pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base.
It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic
front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every
line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an
example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In
order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to
present a double front,–in the first case, to face the valley of the
Danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.
All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the
same precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require
a double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops
into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries
which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception,
since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy
could themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of double
strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an
offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always
dangerous. (See Article XXXVI.)
Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national
or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities.
Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would
have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country
and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus,
Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front,
while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined.
LINES OF DEFENSE.
Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical
lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of
defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as
the line of a fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, which
relate only to the temporary position of an army.
The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a
well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as
ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of
the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the
practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great
obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in
the valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine,
the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of
defense, on account of the important forts found upon them.
Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and
every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary
fortifications, may be regarded as _eventual lines of defense_, both
strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress
of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in
search of a weaker point,–in which case the advantage is evidently
strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident
tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army
from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and
artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other
hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should
fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many
armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense,
it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and
receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[9] In
addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[10] is
difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be
able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the
outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to
Wurmser in Mantua.
STRATEGIC POSITIONS.
There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position
may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for
battle.
Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended
to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be
covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line
of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable
distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli,
Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in
Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The
positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before
the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar
in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in
face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic
positions,–for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily
positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are
sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements,
are of this class.
This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several
points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of
observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the
positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position
of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile
operating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large
detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying
strategic positions.
The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts,
lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a
multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety.
In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with
the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured.
In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of
defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural
or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of
support on the strategic front are called _pivots of operations_, and
are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of
maneuver. For example, in 1796 Verona was an excellent pivot of
operations for all Napoleon’s enterprises about Mantua for eight months.
In 1813 Dresden was his pivot.
Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which
it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the
fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the
pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney’s corps was the pivot of
Napoleon’s maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line
of retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point
of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of
support and endures throughout a campaign.
The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as
short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if
it is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the
extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the
prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous
point.
The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it
be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to
make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a
short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither
should the front of operations be too extended. Such a front is
unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not
a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results
of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful
operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not have produced the same
results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in
1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could
have found another by adopting a new zone of operations.
The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should
be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army
should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the
intervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or
interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front
in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to
a dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part
of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of
security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible
rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front.
An army should never long occupy any strategic point without making
selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there
concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy
when he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleon
prepared the fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that of
Waterloo, and the Archduke Charles that of Wagram.
When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be
careful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might be
called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal
faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for
all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an
attack.
Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point
upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic
front. For instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able
to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in
rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so
as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting
a passage.
For an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation
or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however
brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of
defense as a refuge in case of reverse. This remark is made to complete
the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with
temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (XXIII.)
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 9: This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great
difference. They are treated of in Article XXVII.]
[Footnote 10: It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of
positions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapter
devoted to Grand Tactics, (Article XXX.)]
ARTICLE XXI.
Zones and Lines of Operations.
A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war,
which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object,
whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For
example, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the
right, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army.
A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single _line of
operations_, either on account of the configuration of the country, or
of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein.
Generally, however, a zone presents several _lines of operations_,
depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number
of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations.
It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a
_line of operations_,–though doubtless it may happen that any good road
in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line;
but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the
sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real
line of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to
the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would
not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the
communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole
space bounded by them would constitute but a single line.
The term _zone of operations_ is applied to a large fraction of the
general theater of war; the term _lines of operations_ will designate
the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army.
Whether it follow a single or several routes, the term _strategic
lines_ will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive
points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the
front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to
those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive
points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a
temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. _Lines of
communications_ designate the practicable routes between the different
portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone
of operations.
For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand
Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and
another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden,
Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the
forces. This zone had three _lines of operations_ leading to Leipsic as
an objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading
from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic;
the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by
Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte
from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies
marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be
said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principal
line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon
which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned,
and over which, if compelled, it would retreat.
If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive
combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on
each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities,
it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided
into different classes, according to their relations to the different
positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field,
and to the enterprises projected by the commander.
_Simple lines of operations_ are those of an army acting from a
frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies.
_Double lines of operations_ are those of two independent armies
proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies
which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in
distance and for long intervals of time.[11]
_Interior lines of operations_ are those adopted by one or two armies to
oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the
general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in
a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose
to them a greater force.[12] _Exterior lines_ lead to the opposite
result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time
on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses.
_Concentric lines of operations_ are those which depart from
widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance
of or behind the base.
_Divergent lines_ are those by which an army would leave a given point
to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course,
necessitate a subdivision of the army.
There are also _deep lines_, which are simply _long lines_.
The term _maneuver-lines_ I apply to momentary strategic lines, often
adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be
confounded with the real _lines of operations_.
_Secondary lines_ are those of two armies acting so as to afford each
other mutual support,–as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was
secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration
was secondary to that of Barclay.
_Accidental lines_ are those brought about by events which change the
original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the
highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully
recognized only by a great and active mind.
There may be, in addition, _provisional_ and _definitive lines of
operations_. The first designate the line adopted by an army in a
preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select
a more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to the
class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines
of operations.
These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded
me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than
that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter
has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has
no lines of operations.
The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two
armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of
Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large
depots are immediately behind the river,–certainly the safest, nearest,
and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted.
These armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they
will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different
proposed enterprises.
1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will
extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both
be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in
the interval which separates them from it. Even if Mélas[13] had
possessed a year’s supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have
been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy
occupied the line of the Po.
2. Their line would be double, and the enemy’s single if he concentrated
his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double
exterior line, and the enemy’s a double interior, if the latter divided
his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him
to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to
could unite.
Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on
its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than
when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of
support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the
establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of
operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it
has no line of operations.
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION.
At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia and
Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was included
in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it
being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed.
The real theater extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised three
zones of operations,–the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningue
to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of the
interval between the Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was the
frontier from Givet to Dunkirk.
When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent a
union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the
zones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand in
Belgium. It is quite impossible to understand why the French did not
conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made.
Four months intervened between the declaration of war and the
concentration of the allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion
of Belgium would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given the
King of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced him
not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon
France another form of government?
When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, the
French were no longer able to invade. This _rôle_ was reserved for the
allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves.
The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteen
thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty
leagues and divided into five corps d’armée, and could not make a good
defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was
only necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in
favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could
only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between the
Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the
rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the
excellent fortress of Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted this
plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception.
The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family
reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might
subject her provinces. For some reason, difficult to understand,
Austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five
thousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on the
Rhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterward
displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them
than to protect the flanks of the invading army? This remarkable conduct
on the part of Austria, which cost her so much, may account for the
resolution of Prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field,
as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. During
the campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for
success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they had
anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a more
serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the
advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions,
and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately.
Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez at
Grandpré,–that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he
(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Châlons.
The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with
the false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order to
guard every point.
The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle and
Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and
how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin
of armies.
Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the
strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of
a frontier to prevent invasion,–which was exactly the means of
rendering invasion upon every point feasible.
I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishly
abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater
from the center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, he
was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this
movement, but attacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front,
while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back upon
the North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirely
in a more successful battle than that of Jemmapes.
The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty
direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recovered
Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations
to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves
praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this
enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the
extreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had
been driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized
and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a
few towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new
armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of
the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades of
the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood?
Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are
particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince,
and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of
the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars
of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.[14]
If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris was
France, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had
risen against the government which oppressed them. If, after having
beaten the French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch and
Hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and the
Austrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the Sarre, and the
Moselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part of the useless army
of the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with
its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. It
is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or
running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have performed the
duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the bulk of the army
pursued the remains of Dampierre’s forces. After gaining several
victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on
a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While they
threatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies
of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes
and Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon
the camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one
side and Landau on the other.
It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in
the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they
should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while
the allies were operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded or
aided by the imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this
army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the
Sambre. Do not these false combinations resemble those of Soubise and
Broglie in 1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years’ War?
In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from a
painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations of
this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to
represent them as forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this,
it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the
armies in this campaign and in that of 1757 were almost identical, and
the direction of the operations is quite the same. The French had four
corps, which constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had four
divisions, which composed two armies.
These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on Brussels,
as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The only
difference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanders
were not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this
difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position
of the North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank
the Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of
the enemy,–a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to
great operations. This movement was the same as that of Benningsen on
the Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate
of the Prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon
the Baltic, is another proof of this truth.
If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have
made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a
month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.
The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive
was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six
battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank
Flanders was covered by the corps d’armée of Clairfayt, and upon the
left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of
a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis
was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only _twelve battalions_
were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were
known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to
Clairfayt’s relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army
before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay
invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his
central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and
to beat all his large detachments in detail.
Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having
been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing
this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have
been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and
forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous
diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up
between the sea and two fortresses?
The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical
error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on
Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi
till the 3d of June,–more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid
opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If
the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by
its left,–that is, both upon the Meuse,–the state of affairs would
have been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a line
of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the
different fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack the
center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained
by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of
three hundred miles in extent.
In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principal
theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy,–which opened a new
field of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in this
campaign were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim.
Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces
alternately upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and in
the lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the Sambre
and Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought
Pichegru back to Landau.
In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of
1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. The
armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from the
extremities of the base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794,
they were exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than the
Prince of Coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his
forces at a point nearer than that expected by the French. He then
seized the instant when the Danube covered the corps of Latour, to
steal several marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the
battle of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army of
Moreau to retreat.
Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan is
to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the
battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic
lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidable
army is collected in the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commits
the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. The
lightning is not quicker than Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons
every thing before Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the
first column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it back
upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and
is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the Tyrol to
keep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon whom these
lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of Roveredo and
Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back
upon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges
of the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to
take refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.
In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formed
two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine and
the Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of the
center marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia,
being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. _The three
armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn_, eighty
leagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: he
unites them against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and the
army of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern
Switzerland. The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of
following up their success on this central line, which cost them so
dearly afterward, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the
Lower Rhine. The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the
other trifles at Manheim.
In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leaves
thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon the
Adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force
is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naples
returns to the North, it commits the error of adopting a strategic
direction opposed to Moreau’s, and Suwaroff, by means of his central
position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army
and beats it, while some leagues from the other.
In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is again
changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of
operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks
of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon the
Po. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords no
similar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines,
affording reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt
an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate.
By a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts
off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving
its own relations with its base and with the army of the Rhine, which
forms its secondary line.
Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of
the two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the
armies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and
Mélas; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the
Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of
operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of
Mélas; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. It
may thus be seen that Mélas is cut off from his base, and that, on the
contrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all his
communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines.
The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the
importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military
operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of
defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary’s victory, render his
invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province.
By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted
campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led
to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental
principle already alluded to,–viz.: that _simple and interior lines
enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the
important point, a stronger force than the enemy_. The student may also
satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to
this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits
fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.
From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from
that of many others, the following maxims result:–
1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive
point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the
choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining
this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a
campaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in
1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera,–maneuvers that cannot be too
much studied by military men.
Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The
objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to
be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for
this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first
operation and the new phases it may develop.
2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical
situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position
of the hostile masses upon this strategic field. _In every case,
however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the
extremities. Only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating
would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the
two extremities at the same time_.[15]
It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide
his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line
will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible,
the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the
rear of his line of defense or front of operations.
The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it
affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that
by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy’s
force. Thus, the army of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left of
the line of defense of the Black Forest, caused it to yield almost
without an effort. This army fought two battles on the right bank of the
Danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction
of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia and
Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by the
Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of Mélas were still more
brilliant.
3. Even when the extremity of the enemy’s front of operations is gained,
it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the
assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid this
danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic
direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to
the right or left a safe line of retreat. In this case, to take
advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a
change of direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12.)
The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important
qualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated by
these examples.
If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched upon
Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previously
protected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of the
Po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat
than Mélas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points
of Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and
Tenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of
regaining the Var or the Valais.
In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and had
there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have
been cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from the
Elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar he
placed his front before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof,
which thus became well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussians
had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between Gera
and Baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,–the
excellent road from Leipsic to Frankfort,–as well as the two roads
which lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel.
4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier:
such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large
coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon
the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to
have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the
principal army.
5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces
on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more
advantageous than a double one.
6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either
from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has
been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of
the army to each of his masses.
7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to
exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can
be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate
of the campaign.[16] Such an army may, by a well-combined strategic
plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the
adversary’s forces. To be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body
of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with
instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as
much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling
back upon the principal army.
8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of
force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring
against it. In this case this course will be advantageous,–since a
single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from
acting to advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support well
the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the
respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to
perform.
9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other
maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and
sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in
numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted
space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to
Napoleon at Leipsic.[17] The second is, that interior lines should not
be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the
opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however,
may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as
to conclude the war,–when the fate of these secondary bodies would be
viewed with comparative indifference.
10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than
two divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy,
and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and
supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the
armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the
combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their
junction.
11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the
enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by
a strategic movement,–in which case divergent operations would add to
the dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior,
since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the
pursued.
12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of
operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate and
important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great
disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an
army from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of these
changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to
meet unforeseen events.
At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a
line of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would
have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by
Vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the
Archduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed one
of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the
siege of Olmutz.
In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one
which was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon the
fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open to
the allies. If Mortier and Marmont could have joined him, and had he
possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the
most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career.
13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical
character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on
the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages
to be obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, like
Bohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they
naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the
project of taking the enemy in reverse. The sides of this salient angle
become so important that every means should be taken to render them
impregnable. In default of such central positions, their advantages may
be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following
figure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front of the
army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form two interior
lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior lines A B, F G,
which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. Such was the
result of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809.
[Illustration:
Fig. 4.
K
/
/
/
/
F LLLLLLLLLLLLL G / A LLLLLLLLLLLLLL B
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
H TTTTTTTTTTTTT I C TTTTTTTTTTTTTT D
]
14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the
direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being
naturally dependent upon the former. It has already been shown that the
greatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the
frontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations of
the enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and
cutting him from his base.
But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the
line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the
perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the
figure on page 79. The army E, having the double base A C and C D, if it
marched toward F, instead of to the right toward G H, would lose all the
strategic advantages of its base C D.
The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to
establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army
as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one’s
own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy.
15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the
direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the
principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the
presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, the
choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the
advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the
first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most
certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this
purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was near
Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was crossed by
Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,–viz., that in neither case was there
the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to
procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French in
Holland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of
Prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy
was not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led
the French into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed
because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies
separately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with only
a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at
Lowicz.
When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances
of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to
select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the
position of the enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion between
Napoleon and Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the
most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this
question, which is both strategic and tactical.
Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory
is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the
directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. The
point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the
center or one of the flanks of the enemy.
A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended
line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the
dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not
think of disturbing the bridges.
If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more
concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the
passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass
it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the
bridges. This will be referred to in the article upon the passage of
rivers.
16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to be
noticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home
and one in a hostile country. The nature of the enemy’s country will
also influence these chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps or
the Rhine to carry on war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of
the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always
rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that
unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. On the other
hand, a German army invading France would operate upon a line much more
dangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the first could
be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling and
interest. An army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its
own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants,
authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even
private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad.
Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the
assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert
regions, particularly when the people are not united against the
invader. In provinces like those first named the army would find a
thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about
the only resources. Horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every
thing else must be carried by the army,–thus infinitely increasing the
embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and
dangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of
Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, and
actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of Lithuania.
17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is much
insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It is
that on each side of the line of operations the country should be
cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line:
otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. This rule is
everywhere belied by the events of war. The nature of the country, the
rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the
people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by
diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy
could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a
compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of
taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in
recent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not
contradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna
when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of the
Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and the
Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of Mélas? Did not Eugene march by
way of Stradella and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon
the Mincio but a few leagues from his base?
OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES–WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM.
Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon
definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood;
and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon
themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether
the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these
principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even
admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot
disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural
principles.
In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the
famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable
event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe
in principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional
cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of
opposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from
overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to
establish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in
case of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double lines
of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and
arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment.
Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Blücher, Bernadotte, and
Benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferior
army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed
its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not
upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are
doubly in my favor.
Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the
Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm,
Katzbach, and Dennewitz,–in a word, to faults of execution, entirely
foreign to the principles in question.
What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with
the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain
on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the
decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of
an essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole
army may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armies
are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the
army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in 1813.
If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued the
allies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, have
threatened Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To this
error may be added a fault quite as great,–that of fighting decisive
battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach
his instructions were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for
Blücher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold
movements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over
torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet
Blücher. If he had fulfilled his instructions and Napoleon had followed
up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based
upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line
of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The study
of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814 shows that he
knew how to apply this system.
There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the
injustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon in
Saxony,–viz.: _that his front of operations was outflanked on the
right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the
frontiers of Bohemia_. Such a case is of rare occurrence. A central
position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them.
When Napoleon made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland,
Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile
enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have threatened him in 1807;
but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. To judge of a system of
operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as
much in favor of as against it,–which was by no means the case in 1813,
either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective
forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at
Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of
destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these
officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement.
Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what advantage can
be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army
which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere,
shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented
with being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the enemy who
applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover,
in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, from
the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of
these maxims.
The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic
question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions
founded upon theories. It is, whether the system of central lines loses
its advantages when the masses are very large. Agreeing with
Montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of
the arrangements necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answer
in the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one hundred
thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of
thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them
successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong
against three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and
for several good reasons:–
1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to
bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of
one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily
resist a much larger force.
2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand
men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with
one of the other armies.
3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a
quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and _matériel_ of every kind,
that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts
from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the
impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to
support such numbers.
4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in
check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be
very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such
magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will
probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the
advantages gained by the principal army.
I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric
system. All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and
to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of
principles.
Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad:
all depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentric
lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a
given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately
destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was the
maneuver of Frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of
1767, the fine battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the
operations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by
closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having
pierced the enemy’s center or turned his front, to give them eccentric
directions to disperse the defeated army.[19]
On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. When
they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be
sure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end the
efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately
by a stronger enemy.
Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be
most pernicious,–which should teach us the necessity of detecting the
principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles
and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base
to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines
and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union
before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case
with Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles.
In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated
than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger.
What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser and
Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of Lake
Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels
be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on this
city,–one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Blücher and Wellington,
taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and
the terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable
principles of war cannot be violated with impunity.
Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not
in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim
to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and
were applied by Cæsar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by
Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them
out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various
applications.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 11: This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given
rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.
In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of
_maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great
routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three
routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the
different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three
lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two
armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a
double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment
starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six
other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have
a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to
designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set
them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single
corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal
enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an
accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or
radii, but the operation was not double.]
[Footnote 12: Some German writers have said that I confound central
positions with the line of operations,--in which assertion they are
mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two
masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these
are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have
done better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea of
double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the
theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after
all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.]
[Footnote 13: This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct;
for Mélas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was
unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication
by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to
cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.]
[Footnote 14: The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of
Napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and the
French people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If he
had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that
the capital was at his head-quarters.]
[Footnote 15: The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively
upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their _morale_,
and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.]
[Footnote 16: When the fractions of an army are separated from the main
body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended
to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic
positions, and not lines of operations.]
[Footnote 17: In the movements immediately preceding the battle of
Leipsic, Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of
operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions;
but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of
lines of operations.]
[Footnote 18: I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a
combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but
Macdonald might have fought Blücher to advantage if he had better
understood Napoleon's instructions.]
[Footnote 19: It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of
concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect
that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are some in which he
employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for
example, in the movements about Ratisbon in 1809.]
ARTICLE XXII.
Strategic Lines.
Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which
differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to
define them, for many confound them. We will not consider those
strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of
their position and their relation to the features of the country, like
the lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the
Balkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute
examination of the topography of Europe; and an excellent model for this
kind of study is found in the Archduke Charles’s description of Southern
Germany.
The term _strategic_ is also applied to all communications which lead by
the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to
another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its
objective points. It will be seen, then, that a theater of war is
crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those
only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real
importance. This renders plain the distinction between the general line
of operations of a whole campaign, and these _strategic_ lines, which
are temporary and change with the operations of the army.
Besides territorial strategic lines, there are _strategic lines of
maneuvers_.
An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of
operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that between
the Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia and
the sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at
most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior,
directions,–while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic
lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for
each wing which would join the general line of operations. If it
operated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might adopt,
according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm on Donauwerth
and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulm
with Nuremberg or Mayence.
It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of
operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily
applicable to strategic lines. These may be _concentric_, to inflict a
decisive blow, or _eccentric_, after victory. They are rarely _simple_,
since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they
are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be _interior_ if
the forces be equal, or _exterior_ in the case of great numerical
superiority. The rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes
be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the
forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much
risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the
important masses.
Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against
one of the extremities of the enemy’s front of operations.
The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good
for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply
them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves
mention,–viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of
these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations
exposed to the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done,
to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success;
but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been
taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line
of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to.
We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian army
was based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologne
and Coblentz on Luxembourg and Namur; Wellington’s base was Antwerp,
and his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack
by Napoleon on Flanders decided Blücher to receive battle parallel to
the English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no
uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a good
chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in
Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful
maritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and
seeking refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Blücher had but three
strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht,
that farther north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English army
near Mont St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the
application of interior strategic lines,–which Napoleon here, perhaps
for the first time in his life, neglected. It will readily be seen that
the line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither a
line of operations of the Prussian army nor a line of battle, but a
_strategic line of maneuver_, and was interior. It was bold, because he
exposed fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that he
sought a junction with the English made his movement accord with the
principles of war.
A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. Leaving
Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the right
to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his
primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in
force. His object was to gain communication with Napoleon, whose
intention was to join him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the
beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing
this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. He did
nothing of this kind,–either from forgetfulness, or on account of the
feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,–and the severe
losses at Dennewitz were the result.
Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different
combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended
from the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo
and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley
of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had
moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse.
There were but three courses open to him,–to remain in the narrow
valley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser,
or the last,–which was sublime, but rash,–to follow him into the
valley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two
passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to
hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis
to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano.
The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route from
Trent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a
_strategic line of maneuver_ still bolder than that of Blücher on Wavre.
However, it was an operation of only three or four days’ duration, at
the end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at
Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with
Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in
great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back
either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which
made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for
even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have
interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him
to anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois
from Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian
general, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French
army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would
scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten
at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had
advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there
have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon
him the fate of Vandamme at Culm.
I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time
and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many
adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it
may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its
line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the
enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by
demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what
is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be
adopted under an urgent necessity.
ARTICLE XXIII.
Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases or
Strategic Reserves.
When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or
temporary bases,–which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as
his own frontiers. A river with _têtes de ponts_, and one or two large
towns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army and
to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an
excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be a
temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations
leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had a
good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but,
she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and
became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of
a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation,
particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beaten
in an enemy’s country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its
own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant
temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases,
and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot
expect to find in an enemy’s country safe positions suitable even for a
temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic
reserve,–which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits
deserve notice.
STRATEGIC RESERVES.
Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive,
who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of
skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government
always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them
when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army
has its own, and every corps d’armée or division should not fail to
provide one.
The reserves of an army are of two kinds,–those on the battle-field,
and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the
latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of
war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend
not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and
the distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an army
takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of
being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve
between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active
reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of
menaced points without weakening the active army. It is true that to
form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active
service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be
instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central
depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them
the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and
adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be
formed capable of important service.
Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Even
in 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert on
the Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in the
neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the part
alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near
Vienna.
In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and Mortier used
them to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming at
Mayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between
the Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleon
decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed, with
much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixty
thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the English
and to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her
interests.
The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it was
badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg or
Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving
Prince Hohenlohe and Blücher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin.
These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the
country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the
double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity,
of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its
flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve.
Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and
whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the
troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distant
invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the
scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the
frontier, they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally be
dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new
levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under
the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be
indispensable.
The general’s talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these
reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line
of operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of
a hostile state. He also decides upon their position, and endeavors to
use for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much
as the withdrawal of his good troops.
These reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base
and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been
reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if
there be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up
intrenched camps or _têtes de ponts_ to protect the depots and to
increase the strength of their positions.
All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to
temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable
if they possess such well-located pivots.
ARTICLE XXIV.
The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of Marches.
_By the system of positions_ is understood the old manner of
conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies
at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the other
covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the
other counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was war
from the Middle Ages to the era of the French Revolution. During this
revolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or less
value sprang up. War was commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the
French encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them.
It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and within, that this
system was changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one million men in
fourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had neither tents,
provisions, nor money. On their marches they bivouacked or were
quartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of
success. Their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns,
which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account of
the broken character of the country of Flanders and the Vosges, they
threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the
columns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at
first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the
methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their generals. Mack,
to whom was attributed the success of the Prince of Coburg, increased
his reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose
an open order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the
poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried
the positions.
The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and nothing more.
The principal direction of affairs was in the hands of Carnot and of the
Committee of Public Safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad.
Carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the
war. In 1793 he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of
Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly
from point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these
different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate France.
The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of circumstances,
and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement
of the army of the Moselle on the Sambre; and it was this which led to
the success of Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium.
In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they were imputed
to treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by
Clairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they had been by Mack and the
Prince of Coburg. The Archduke Charles, applying the principle of
interior lines, triumphed over Moreau and Jourdan in 1796 by a single
march.
Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large,–either
to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it
better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders
to arrange them for battle. The reserves were small detachments,
incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in
overwhelming but a single division. Such was the state of affairs when
Napoleon made his _début_ in Italy. His activity from the beginning
worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances,
his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. He conquered the
Italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. His
march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by the necessity of
overcoming the Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements
from the Rhine.
The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new
era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He
adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the
capture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less
extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies
of two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was
here fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely
corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system
of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy
not to meet with his approval.
It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to
all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there
can be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the
old system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches and
camps of the Seven Years’ War with those of the _seven weeks’_ war,–as
Napoleon called the campaign of 1806,–or with those of the three months
which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till
its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to
the relative merits of the two systems.
The system of Napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight,
and then to camp in quiet_. He told me that he knew no other method of
conducting a war than this.
It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his
personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in
urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a
throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare
to adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of very
distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and,
without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has
marked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions will
for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much
modified and improved.
If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches,
humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and
bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun,
are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian
hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not
likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has
been demonstrated by Napoleon’s wars,–viz.: that remoteness is not a
certain safeguard against invasion,–that a state to be secure must have
a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and
military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. Then
the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as
reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more
formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more
necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results.
If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,–if nations, instead
of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to
acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political
equilibrium,–then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and
perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale.
Then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men
return to a mixed system of war,–a mean between the rapid incursions of
Napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. Until
then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced
so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an
active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion.
The science of marches now includes more than details, like the
following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of
departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and
the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part
of the duties of the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these very
important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations
of strategy. For instance, the march of Napoleon by the Saint-Bernard
to fall upon the communications of Mélas, those made in 1805 by
Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by Gera to turn the Prussians,
the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that
of the Russian army on Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive
operations, not because of their relation to Logistics, but on account
of their strategic relations.
Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great
principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point;
and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in
Article XIX. What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of
operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the
enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jena
were the same maneuvers; and what was Blücher’s march at Waterloo but an
application of interior strategic lines?
From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to
throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the
front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the
principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. The
operations of the French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of
Napoleon in 1796, 1809, and 1814, are models of this kind.
One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to
so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest
strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple
object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease
and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. However, it
is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of
concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow.
This alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the
true test of a great general.
There is another kind of marches, designated as _flank marches_, which
deserves notice. They have always been held up as very dangerous; but
nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term
_flank marches_ are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of
battle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate
operations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to
ordinary strategic marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous in
them, unless the most common precautions of Logistics be neglected. In a
strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by
about two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced
guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) In such a case there
could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another.
There are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether
inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations,
of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as
to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was the
famous project of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on
the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies.
It was modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of the
author.
The second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was
the case with Napoleon at Borodino,) and particularly if this line
affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flank
movement exposing this line would be a great fault.
In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are
still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a
change of the line of operations. The physical and moral condition of
the troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanders
will, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements.
The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so
was that upon Milan after the passage of the Chiusella, and that of
Marshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at Ossiek; and their successful
issue is well known.
A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a
different affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this kind at Dennewitz,
and so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick at Kolin.
Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen was a
true flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed
by the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its
camp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock
Daun was taken in flank, and not Frederick.
In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line
of battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a
right or left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy’s line were
not _flank marches_, because the flank of the column was the real front
of the line of battle.
The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to turn the
lines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that of Leuthen, and
no less successful.
In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not
strategic. The march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one of the
greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred to
was a movement made to turn the French camp the evening before the
battle.
ARTICLE XXV.
Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches.
The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the
commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be
supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy’s
country is a very difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relation
between the commissariat and strategy.
It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes subsisted
their immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a hard task to
supply thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages, the Greeks,
barbarians, and more lately the Crusaders, maintained considerable
bodies of men in that country. Cæsar said that war should support war,
and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of the
countries he overran.
The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds,
and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the Huns, Vandals,
Goths, and Mongols who successively traversed Europe, and how they lived
during their marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaders
would also be an interesting subject of research.
In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies
of Francis I., in crossing the Alps into Italy, did not carry with them
large stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or
fifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of
the Ticino and Po.
Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger; they fought
on their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were
established as they moved. This interfered greatly with operations,
restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon
the means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the
number of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to
camp.
During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity.
The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes in
the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the
country, and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on the
granaries of Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and
Danube, is easy,–particularly if it marches in a number of columns and
does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but
this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite
impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily be
conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where
every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers’ legs. This
system gave Napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it
on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable.
A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded
country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the
local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to
make them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their
fulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should create
provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary
powers. The provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points
most convenient for the operations of the army. In order to husband
them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care
to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them.
The inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the
supplies to the points occupied by the troops.
It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to
undertake without having previously established these depots, as much
depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of
the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:–
1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one
hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from
the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of
country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any
single operation.
As the first operation never requires more than a month, during which
time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be
sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants
of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain
at a particular point. Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it was
besieging Ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if
there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed.
2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies
obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the
wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a
position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise.
3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be
echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of
communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the
army, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successive
supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should
be as well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to have
the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations,
which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement has two
real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of
the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it
facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single
point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the
initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the
offensive and gained some advantage.
4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its
most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to
advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient
provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its
lines of depots.
5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in
their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it
is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and
without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under
these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not
impossible.
6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but
it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after
the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid
expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should
consist of the most portable articles,–as biscuit, rice, &c.: the
wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of
roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country,
and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these
vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to
take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the
successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry
with him several days’ rations of bread, rice, or even of flour.
7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of
supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply
himself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of
a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications
with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus
exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the
mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army
advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its
communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the
progress of the army.
8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base
itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its
ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic
front opposed to the sea.
9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations
of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also
free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise
necessary. For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the
most favorable. The water-communications themselves are not in this case
the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is
essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from
the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior
flank upon the river,–which might be as dangerous as if it were the
sea.
In the enemy’s country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for
transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a
small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render it
sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,–which is hazardous, as
Mortier experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages
of rivers are more substantial.
10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be
fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous
countries, in numbers to last for some little time. This source of
supply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan
leads to plunder. The requisitions for cattle should be well regulated;
and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchased
elsewhere.
I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which may
appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that in
his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops
were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy
to procure every thing in abundance. This is a remark upon which it
would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the
success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war
differs from narrow theory.
ARTICLE XXVI.
The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines.–Wars of
Sieges.
Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers;
secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign.
The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate.
It is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great
natural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and
these admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. The problem here
is simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. The Alps and the
Pyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, of
Erzgebirge, of the Böhmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, and
of the Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a
good system of fortresses.
Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was best
covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine, of
Mont-Genèvre, and of Mont-Cenis,–the only ones considered
practicable,–were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of
considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains
of Piedmont. It was certainly no easy matter to surmount these
difficulties.
These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage
of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be
carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other
route hitherto deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by Francis
I.,–which is so well described by Gaillard,–Napoleon’s passage of the
Saint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in
the remark of Napoleon, _that an army can pass wherever a titan can set
his foot_,–a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man,
and applied by him with great success.
Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or
as a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so
well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and
communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot be
said that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as long
as the Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the real
frontier of France and Germany; for the French for long periods held
points upon the right bank, while the Germans were in possession of
Mayence, Luxembourg, and the _têtes de ponts_ of Manheim and Wesel on
the left bank.
If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, and
Adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they
should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they
permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations.
An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria from
Austria: flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north by
Bohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by the three
fortified places of Passau, Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with some
poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose
curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most
rapid of rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of
“impregnable” was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800,
1805, and 1809.
The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means so
formidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally open, or
consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number
of points. We propose to give a set of general maxims equally
applicable to all cases.
When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to
make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses,
requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not
prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. It is much wiser to build
fewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectation
of absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the
impediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support the
movements of the army which is to repel him.
If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the
progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels
the army to detach a part of its force or to make _détours_ in its
march; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to
the army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and,
finally, is a place of refuge in case of need.
Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations;
and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy.
The first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in
the distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the
forts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege;
the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege
which it proposes to cover.
As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same
degree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. They
are an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the
state whose men and money are wasted upon them. There are many in Europe
in this category. It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses
very close together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban,
who, on the contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the great
number of points the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on this point
are as follow:–
1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, and
should extend from the frontiers toward the capital.[20] There should be
three in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the
third, near the center of the state. If there be four fronts, this would
require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places.
It will be objected that this number is large, and that even Austria has
not so many. It must be recollected that France has more than forty upon
only a third of its frontiers, (from Besançon to Dunkirk,) and still has
not enough on the third line in the center of the country. A Board
convened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses has
decided quite recently that more were required. This does not prove that
there were not already too many, but that certain points in addition
should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too much
crowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence.
Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to Basel, one from
Basel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in addition to the totally
distinct line of the Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts,
requiring forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that this
is enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the
northeast. The system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important
element of their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she is
bordered by the small German states, which, instead of being hostile,
place their own forts at her disposal. Moreover, the number above given
is what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts of
nearly equal development. Prussia, being long and narrow, and extending
from Königsberg almost to the gates of Metz, should not be fortified
upon the same system as France, Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical
position and extent of states may either diminish or increase the number
of fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included.
2. Fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points
already designated in Article XIX. As to their tactical qualities, their
sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in
order to increase the difficulty of blockading them.
3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own
defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those
situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. Mayence, Coblentz,
and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are true illustrations and models of
this kind. Places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command
three different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, for
instance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the Main the
fort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the most formidable
place in Europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men:
so that works of this extent must be few in number.
4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are
preferable to small ones,–particularly when the assistance of the
citizens can be relied on for their defense. Metz arrested the whole
power of Charles V, and Lille for a whole year delayed Eugene and
Marlborough. Strasbourg has many times proved the security of French
armies. During the last wars these places were passed without being
besieged by the invading forces, because all Europe was in arms against
France; but one hundred and fifty thousand Germans having in their front
one hundred thousand French could not penetrate to the Seine with
impunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points.
5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps,
and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized
armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial
obstacles. The exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the
true course is a mean between these extremes. Doubtless, it will always
be of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies of
the enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable to
pass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will be
unwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also, very much depends upon
the situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit of
the nations.
If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not follow in
the footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it probable that fifty
thousand French will very soon risk themselves beyond the Noric Alps, in
the very heart of Austria, as Napoleon did in 1797.[21] Such events only
occur under exceptional circumstances.
6. It may be concluded from what precedes,–1st, that, while fortified
places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by
dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; 2d,
that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line
of these forts,–always, however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d,
that an army cannot pass a large river, like the Danube or the Rhine,
without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order
to secure a good line of retreat. Once master of this place, the army
may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege other
places; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as the
army advances, since the enemy’s opportunities of hindering the siege
are correspondingly diminished.
7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly
people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an
enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the
operations of an army in the field. The fort of Königstein in 1813 was
as useful to the French as the fortress of Dresden, because it procured
a _tête de pont_ on the Elbe.
In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value
to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and
not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort of Bard, in the valley
of Aosta, almost arrested Napoleon’s army in 1800.
8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses
as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to
facilitate military operations. Walled cities with a shallow ditch may
be very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots,
hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of any
small bodies that may traverse the vicinity. They will be particularly
serviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weaken
the active army.
9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions
are a positive misfortune for both the army and state.
10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war,
except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental
army, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. Benningsen
almost lost the Russian armies by basing them in 1807 on
Königsberg,–which he did because it was convenient for supply. If the
Russian army in 1812, instead of concentrating on Smolensk, had
supported itself on Dunaburg and Riga, it would have been in danger of
being forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases.
The relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of
two kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified places without
attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to
watch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each other
it will be necessary to leave an entire corps d’armée, under a single
commander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. When
the invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry
on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may either
continue its march or take a position to cover the siege.
Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole
army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and
contravallation. These lines cost as much in labor and expense as the
siege itself. The famous case of the lines of Turin, which were fifteen
miles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand French,
were forced by Prince Eugene with forty thousand men in 1706, is enough
to condemn this ridiculous system.
Much as the recital of the immense labors of Cæsar in the investment of
Alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in
our times will imitate his example. Nevertheless, it is very necessary
for the investing force to strengthen its position by detached works
commanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the
siege might be disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon at
Mantua, and by the Russians at Varna.
Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and
pursue as far as possible the enemy’s forces which could interfere. If
the besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a
strategic position covering all the avenues by which succor might
arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be
spared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approaching
army and decide whether the siege shall continue or not.
Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the
operations of an army of observation.
INTRENCHED LINES.
Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to
above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and
is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is
intended to protect a part of the frontiers.
As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an
army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of
intrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extent
closing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may be
regarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines many leagues in length
and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. For instance,
those of Wissembourg, which, covered by the Lauter flowing in front,
supported by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemed
to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on
every occasion when they were assailed.
The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the same
part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and
those of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate.
The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,) although
intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in
question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. However well
they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes
their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned.
To bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and
surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is
manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another
instance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will treat of
their attack and defense.
It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended
lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be
derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging
force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 20: The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of
such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles
of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the Russians would not
have reached Adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.]
[Footnote 21: Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the
Frioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the
Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to
beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined him. In view of the
circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the
principles of war.]
ARTICLE XXVII.
The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Têtes de Ponts with Strategy.
It would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of
ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards,
or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts.
Only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and
even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford
an army.
It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which saved
Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, that
such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in
1800, enabled Kray to arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on
the Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of
Torres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the country
between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla.
The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be
established on strategic points which should also possess tactical
advantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812,
it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their
defensive system, which should have rested upon Smolensk and Moscow.
Hence the Russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days.
The maxims which have been given for the determination of the great
decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because
they ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of these
camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure
for an offensive operation, as _têtes de ponts_ to assure the crossing
of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for
a defeated army.
However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult
to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of
Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it can
be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to
abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden
was an important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it
was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an
ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps
within a few days for want of provisions.
Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary
support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even
when the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in
reverse,–that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a
_coup de main_. It is also important that they be established close to a
fortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of
the camp nearest to the line of retreat.
In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tête de pont_
on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city
like Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never
be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of
collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy,
it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the
open country.
The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly
advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a
French army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost
when the space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but if
it were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a
little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the
enemy in the interior of France and between the relieving force and the
intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine.
We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but
several German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover
places or to prevent sieges,–which appears to me to be a little
sophistical. Doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a place
when an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the forts
and camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real and
principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a
temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively
upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such a
camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply
to retard a siege, would be folly. The example of Wurmser, who prolonged
the defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did not
his army perish? And was this sacrifice really useful? I do not think
so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and the
siege-train having fallen into the hands of the Austrians, the siege was
necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by
reason of famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser’s presence ought
rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender.
The intrenched camp of the Austrians before Mayence in 1795 would,
indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the French had
possessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the Rhine had not
been crossed; but as soon as Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau in
the Black Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the
place to its own means of defense. It would only be in the event of a
fortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army
to pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object
of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place in
Europe is upon such a site?
So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the contrary, it
seems to me that a very important question in the establishment of these
camps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the
same bank as the place, or upon the other. When it is necessary to make
a choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to
cover both banks, I should decidedly prefer the latter.
To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the
bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal
danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by
passing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the
same bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the
other bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to take
the latter in reverse. For instance, the Russians, who could not hold
for twenty-four hours their camp of Drissa, would have defied the enemy
for a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank of
the Dwina, covering the rear of the camp. So Moreau for three months, at
Kehl, withstood all the efforts of the Archduke Charles; while if
Strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp would
easily have been turned by a passage of the Rhine.
Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified
place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would
fulfill this condition. The fortification of Coblentz, recently
constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. This system of the
Prussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanent
works, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its
defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense
advantages to an army intended to operate on the Rhine. Indeed, the
inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are only
very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed to
the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to Napoleon
at Essling,)–to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisions
and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works might
not avail. The system of detached permanent works of Coblentz has the
advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the
same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from
attack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city were
upon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp
of field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security
either for the depots or the army. So, if Coblentz were a good ordinary
fortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily make
it a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouching
from it in the presence of an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein,
which is intended to protect Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult
of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress of
a force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed.
Much has been recently said of a new system used by the Archduke
Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of Linz,–by masonry towers.
As I only know of it by hearsay and the description by Captain Allard in
the _Spectateur Militaire_, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know
that the system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel Andreis
appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of
improvements,–which the archduke seems to have added. We are told that
the towers of Linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, have
the advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of being
sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. Such towers, if well
flanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous
camp,–always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines.
If the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered by
field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp
preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous
as afforded by the large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number
thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort
commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right bank,
some seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference of this line
is about twelve miles. The towers are between five hundred and six
hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a
palisaded covered way. They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with
a barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven
twenty-four pounders. Two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Those
towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the _déblais_ of which forms
a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but I should
think it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire.
Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete
bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of the first rank,
would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a
quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an
entirely different object. If these works are to resist a regular siege,
they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp
to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube for a large
army, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war
like that of 1809, and, if existing then, would probably have saved the
capital.
To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to
encircle Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built
seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the
Traun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to
have included for the camp only the curved space between Linz, the
Traun, and the Danube. Then the double advantage of a fortress of the
first rank and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even
if not quite so large, would have answered for a large army,
particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of
Perlingsberg had been preserved.
TÊTES DE PONTS.
_Têtes de ponts_ are the most important of all field-works. The
difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face
of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works,
which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if
the bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which
may attend a rapid retreat across a large river.
_Têtes de ponts_ are doubly advantageous when they are as it were
_keeps_ for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also
cover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then they
will mutually support each other. It is needless to state that these
works are particularly important in an enemy’s country and upon all
fronts where there are no permanent works. It may be observed that the
principal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of
_têtes de ponts_ is that the best intrenched camps are composed of
detached and closed works, while _têtes de ponts_ usually consist of
contiguous works not closed. An intrenched line to admit of defense must
be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generally
require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are
detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them.
The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent
part of this volume.
ARTICLE XXVIII.
Strategic Operations in Mountains.
A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under
four different aspects. It may be the whole theater of the war, or it
may be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or
there may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may
debouch into large and rich plains.
If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of Turkey and
Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the European countries
the mountains are in single ranges. In these cases there is but a
difficult defile to cross,–a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome,
is an advantage rather than an objection. In fact, the range once
crossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may
be regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and
find a temporary refuge. The only essential precaution to be observed
is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of
retreat. The part of the Alps between France and Italy, and the
Pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of this
nature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the Black Forest, and the
Vosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the mountains cover the whole
country as far as the Ebro: if the war were limited to this province,
the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line of
mountains. Hungary in this respect differs little from Lombardy and
Castile; for if the Crapacks in the eastern and northern part are as
marked a feature as the Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary
obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of
the Waag, of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of
Mongatsch, would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss
for a field of operations. The only difference would be in the roads,
which in the Alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in Hungary
there are none of much value. In its northern part, this chain, though
not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class of
fields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its
evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of the
Waag or the Theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. The
attack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic study
of the most interesting character.
When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or Switzerland,
is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains is
secondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies
deciding the great contests in the valleys. It will, of course, be
otherwise if this be the whole field.
It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave
control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave
control of the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent and
competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that
the valley of the Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, in
this kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and their
arrangement in the country. If sixty thousand French were advancing on
Bavaria in presence of an equal force of Austrians, and the latter
should throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, intending to replace
them by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn, it would be difficult
for the French to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a force
on its flanks masters of the outlets of Scharnitz, Fussen, Kufstein, and
Lofers. But if the French force were one hundred and twenty thousand
men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority over
the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to
mask the passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as Linz,–as
Moreau did in 1800.
Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only
accessory zones. If we regard them as the principal fields of
operations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. The
campaigns of 1799 and 1800 are equally rich in instruction on this
branch of the art. In my account of them I have endeavored to bring out
their teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and I cannot
do better than refer my readers to it.
When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland by
the French Directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of
the theater of operations and making it reach from the Texel to Naples,
we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of France and Austria in the
transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of
Switzerland. Every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying
the interesting campaigns of the Archduke Charles, Suwaroff, and
Massena in 1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau in 1800. The first is
a model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is
a model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided
on the plains.
I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this
study.
When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal
theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely
based upon maxims applicable in an open country.
Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations
of the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. In
such a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small
number of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced
guards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide
means for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate
these valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for
the passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small
bodies of light troops.
The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the
larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in
number; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its
forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct
attacks to dislodge it.
However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and
difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. On the
contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these
centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of
retreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it
would be in an open country; since the occupation of one or two
difficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of the
whole army.
If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be
admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity
of covering all the outlets by which an attack in force may be made
upon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversal
marches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points.
In order to complete what I have said upon this kind of marches and the
difficulties of directing them, I will refer to what Napoleon did in
1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this operation was facilitated by the
hundred roads which cross Swabia in all directions, and if it would have
been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal
routes, to make the long circuit from Donauwerth by Augsburg to
Memmingen, it is also true that Mack could by these same hundred roads
have effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been
entrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or of the Tyrol, from
which there was but a single outlet.
On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country
concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to
occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be
easy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very
mountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principal
routes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of the
enemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious
inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be not
observed.
Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in
mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we
attempt simply to give advice in such cases,–to say nothing of laying
down maxims for them. If it were but a question of the defense of a
single definite front of small extent, consisting of four or five
converging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of two
or three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be
easier of solution. It would then be sufficient to recommend the
construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turned
point of each of these valleys. Protected by these forts, a few brigades
of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half the
army should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would be in
position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously
threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he
debouches. If to this be added good instructions to the commanders of
the advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for
rendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to
continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the
general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the
many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. But, if
there be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of which
are to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of the
defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of a
cordon of forts becomes dangerous,–while it is not easy to adopt a
better one.
We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration
of the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan’s
defeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen and
Rheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had
enemies in front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch,
and at Chur; Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian
army menaced the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend
such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great
valleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, toward
Soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the
trap in which the French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot of
the defense. But how could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? how
abandon Rheineck and the Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the
approach by Berne, without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the
Coalition? And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would
be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching
force? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the
masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender
the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an
inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it.
After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it
seemed that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the line
of the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis,–a line shorter
than that of the Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance
to the attacks of the Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into
Lombardy by the Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction with
the archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to prove
that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense
in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense,
because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only be
remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the
offensive.
General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on
the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind
of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he
might lose the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends by
demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active
attack,–which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in
mountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this point, it
ought to be dispelled by Massena’s campaign in Switzerland, where he
sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even
when he was obliged to seek him on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard.
Napoleon’s course was similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposed
to Wurmser and Alvinzi.
As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading
the events of Suwaroff’s expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon the
Muttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to
capture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the
presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that
general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the
Muttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe had
been, and extricated himself with equal ability. Not less extraordinary
was the ten days’ campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousand
men was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand
allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after
four admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory
_in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will
is worth more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons,
need I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not
to risk one’s self in the valleys without securing the heights? Shall I
say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations
should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally,
that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the
great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great
mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of
defending the country?
I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous
countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a
national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes
with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every
advance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is always
necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or
less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of
Stanz and of the Tyrol.
The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case:
it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are
extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous.
In the first case there is little more to be done than this,–viz.: make
demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the
enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which
promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break
through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the
defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole
line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture of
Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men
on Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing
this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show
that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous
mountain-ranges can generally be forced.
The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army
which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between
Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those
_insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him
it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have
already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and
Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it
inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral
issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into
these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army
toward Turin or Carignano.
When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and
the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to
regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a
single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought
to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In
my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to
confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the
columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six
roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened;
but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the
routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the
enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon’s passage of the
Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the
center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to
divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march.
The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much
greater and more difficult task than where a dénouement may be
accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of
battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous
region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it
would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow
and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the
invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or
three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated,
the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the
junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be
driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys.
Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would
be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with
their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple
number.
To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with
localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies,
would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best
school for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by
the Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my
History of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of
the Grisons by Ségur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr
and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the
passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this
study.
ARTICLE XXIX.
Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.
There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those
which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The
second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of
country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea
by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the
seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes
the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great,
but where a powerful state is attacked.
As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the
Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly
be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of
these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its
base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the
same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of
defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their
arsenals;–while in the other case its resources would be upon the
Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad
fate of many of these great invasions.
In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is
merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own
interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in
the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of
all the armies,–particularly if he belong to the state which is not a
principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General
Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty
thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the
mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand
men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus
found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity
of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his
misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of
about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been
hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The
battle of Austerlitz–due to a fault of Weyrother–endangered the
Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became
the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the
opportunity of regaining its own country.
The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the
expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann’s corps at Bergen in
Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander
under such circumstances. General Benningsen’s position in 1807 was less
disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his
communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in
no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of
the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great
abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were
allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political
ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension
which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have
been cited in Article XIX., on political objective points.
History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions
across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with
forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were
necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to
the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran
empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery
and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly
since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer
together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining
each other, no such events have taken place.
Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the
Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of
Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been
scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of
Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions;
for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in
Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the
Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and,
besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no
one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe
from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be
imitated.
Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all
invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the
same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from
these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of
operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones
applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable,
although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812,
although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His
care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while
Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered
Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he
had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself
safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply
on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success.
If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic
precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of
troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at
Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was
unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which
that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do
not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the
conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune;
although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place
immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised
distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin.
Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to
know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of
wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been
possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having
previously defeated the Russian army.
It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of
Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a _dénouement_
between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the bravery
of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the
people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and
sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have
given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia,
he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and
enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the
greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm.
The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point
for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is “never
to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance
of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a
proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which
may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of
resuming the offensive.” As to the precautions to be observed in these
operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the
safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual
bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to
these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles,
seasons, and countries,–in short, accuracy in calculation and
moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried
too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can
insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five
or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly
ruined nations and armies.
Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been
rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in
date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the
sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers,
has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships,
but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions.
It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now
is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest
of Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when
Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his
fleet coasted the shore.
Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that
the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of
immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert.
Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress
depends upon the winds,–which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind
of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare
occurrence.
The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of
operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are
the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations
of war.
Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones,
are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking
Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon
the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the
Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of
Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going
as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable
troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all
be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be
undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in
view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general.
Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions
as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in
Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not
be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of
policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that
day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551,
and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the
strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their
co-operation cannot be obtained.
EPITOME OF STRATEGY
* * * * *
The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled
by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which
enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the
definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important
operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that
we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treating
of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations
of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of
which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.
By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will
be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give
a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.
From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the
manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters
of operations is found in what follows:–
1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the
reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in
accordance with Article XVIII.
2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic
field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy
with the least risk to one’s self.
3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of
operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke
Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for
retreats parallel to the frontiers.
On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success
of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the
extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was
successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations
upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined
by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims
presented in Article XXI.
4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them
such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the
forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from
affording each other mutual support.
5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic
positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important
strategic points of the theater of war.
6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and
activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may
be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of
the hostile army.
The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an
army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the
enemy’s, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will
be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive
strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to
the enemy can be given.
However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive
course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with
attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and
successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy,
thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and
continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of
gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom.
The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most
satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, already
mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may be found in
Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty
battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and
Landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four
victories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have been
found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive
strategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of the
Coalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon
the Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the
most severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most
pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic
principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most
decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon.
The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples.
It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be
able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of
war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own
country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and
of _têtes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great
decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of
the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these lines
and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon has
afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon and
Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads from
the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by
different fortified places projected or completed.
