CHAPTER II.
MILITARY POLICY.
We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embraces
the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If the
political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral,
there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a
war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We
include these under the head of _Military Policy_.
Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any
projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy;
and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be
assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and
without deviating from my intention,–which is, not to give a treatise
on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military
operations.
Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be
fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves,
their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government
or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters
and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence
of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their
operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established
force of the state and its armament, the military geography and
statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the
resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of
which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.
There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government
should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and
that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the
arrangement of all plans. We propose to sketch the principal points
which ought to guide in this sort of combinations.
ARTICLE XI.
Military Statistics and Geography.
By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge
possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy
with whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the
topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all
the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the
examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in
the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the
country. Besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his
chief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty of
cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day,
despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical,
diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. I will cite two
examples of which I was cognizant. In 1796, Moreau’s army, entering the
Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles and
forests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the
declivities of the plateau that slope to the Rhine, that these, with
their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the
sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain.
The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army supposed the
interior of Bohemia to be very mountainous,–whereas there is no
district in Europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding
it has been crossed, which may be done in a single march.
All European officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to
the Balkan and the Turkish force in the interior. It seemed that it was
given out at Constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable
barrier and the palladium of the empire,–an error which I, having lived
in the Alps, did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeply
rooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals of
which are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and
would defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has proved
that the old regulations which placed the elite of the Janissaries in
the frontier-cities of the Danube made the population of those cities
more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. In fact, the projects
of reform of the Sultan Mahmoud required the overthrow of the old
system, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that the
empire was defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a mere
multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a
national defense.
Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography
and statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set forth in
treatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote an essay upon
them, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe, was not
fortunate in his maxims and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he
represents as impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the
Tyrol and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphed
with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805, and
1809.
But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the
European staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for
instruction in them,–at least for the special staff school. Awaiting
the time when some studious officer, profiting by those published and
unpublished documents, shall present Europe with a good military and
strategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress of
topography of late years, partially supply the want of it by the
excellent charts published in all European countries within the last
twenty years. At the beginning of the French Revolution topography was
in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassini, the
works of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and Prussian
staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. The
charts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and
Paris, as well as those of the institute of Herder at Fribourg, promise
to future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors.
Military statistics is not much better known than geography. We have but
vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and
navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by
a state,–which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan
operations. Our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important
subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in military
enterprises.
ARTICLE XII.
Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of a War.
As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful
enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts
to allay them. We have nothing to add to what has been said on this
point under the head of national wars.
On the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his
own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he
endeavors to repress in his adversaries. All armies are alike
susceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, vary
with the national character. Military eloquence is one means, and has
been the subject of many a treatise. The proclamations of Napoleon and
of Paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and
those of Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of
their different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and the
miracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by very
different means. In general, a cherished cause, and a general who
inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means of
electrifying an army and conducing to victory. Some dispute the
advantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness in
battle. Both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm
impels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in
maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it,
disorder easily results.
The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the
armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to
rules. A cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value
of their troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared
with that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the most solidly
organized troops in Europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against
undisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave
may be its individuals.[1] Concert in action makes strength; order
produces this concert, and discipline insures order; and without
discipline and order no success is possible. The Russian general would
not be so bold before European troops having the same instruction and
nearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, a general may attempt
with a Mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with a
Napoleon.
The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences
the boldness of their operations. A general whose genius and hands are
tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match
for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal.
As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of
victory, all other things being equal. It is true that great generals
have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not make
a rule. An order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the
hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general
had prepared for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks which
cannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on that account to
deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? This
risk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that they
are applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended to
apply them, and are the cause of its success. But, in admitting this
truth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; this
objection is not well founded, for a general’s science consists in
providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of
course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the number of
battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to
accident, it would not invalidate my assertion.
If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it
will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of
the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the
most essential parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately,
this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank,
age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as
the public interest and justice. This subject is so important that we
will devote to it a separate article.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of
the greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication,
&c., and may--as in the case of the French in 1812--make a retreat very
disastrous.]
ARTICLE XIII.
Military Institutions.
One of the most important points of the military policy of a state is
the nature of its military institutions. A good army commanded by a
general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with
a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a
great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be
combined.
Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:–
1. To have a good recruiting-system;
2. A good organization;
8. A well-organized system of national reserves;
4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as
well as those of a campaign;
5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of
subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the
formalities of the service;
6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;
7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;
8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to
defensive and offensive arms;
9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an
organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical
education of its officers;
10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general
administration;
11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the
principal operations of war;
12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.
To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and
equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of
battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the
troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and
health of veterans.
None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave
inconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without
national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered Prussia to fall in
fifteen days under the attacks of Napoleon. On the other hand, it has
often been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a good
army. It was the care and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming and
instructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capable
of the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the Macedonians to subjugate
India and Persia with a handful of choice troops. It was the excessive
love of his father for soldiers which procured for Frederick the Great
an army capable of executing his great enterprises.
A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus
culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its
standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing
for it success. We are far from saying that a government should
sacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it
ought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if the
prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to
fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case–which is, unfortunately,
of too frequent occurrence–the defect must be supplied by wise
institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the
general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of
national reserves.
There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the
executive the power of adopting the best systems. If the armies of the
Roman and French republics, and those of Louis XIV. and Frederick of
Prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of
operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle,
it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form
of government exercises a great influence in the development of the
military strength of a nation and the value of its troops.
When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected
by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and
penurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive,
whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a
chief devoted to all the national interests.
The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to
this deplorable result. Then it will be impossible for the most
far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war,
whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country at
some future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist
sudden aggressions.
In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members
of an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be Richelieus,
Pitts, or Louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the
institutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army
to fall into decay? Deceived by the seductive fallacies of an
exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves and
their constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable to
the more statesmanlike preparations for war?
I am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the
sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of
things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible,
except under conditions not existing in all countries. I simply mean
that civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in
a short time,–that they should never be found unprepared. And the
wisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation
as foresight in their administration and the perfection of their system
of military policy.
If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms,
governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are
less suitable than others for the creation or preparation of a
formidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises these
deliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, and
have concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength.
Still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a list
of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed
under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the
extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and
themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures
and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which
overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. Here
it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of
power, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the
true cause of the display of energy. What happened in the Convention
after the fall of Robespierre and the terrible Committee of Public
Safety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1815. Now, if the
dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank
of safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion that
countries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically and
militarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other respects they
present decided advantages.
It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in
the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to
degenerate. It is important to foster the military spirit in the armies,
and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintly
resembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage in
preparing them for war. It is not less important to prevent them from
becoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in labors
useful for the defense of the country.
The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst
possible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system of divisions and
permanent corps d’armée seems to be much preferable. In general terms,
the Russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and
if in many points its customs would be useless and impracticable
elsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well be
copied from it.
As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service,
and at the same time to open a way for merit. Three-fourths of the
promotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and the
remaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. On
the contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should be
suspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the
other two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services.
The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war:
it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of
success. Every one can recall how nearly fatal to the French at Bylau
and Marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. We may also refer
to the great gain of the heavy French cavalry in the resumption of the
cuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. Every one knows the
great advantage of the lance. Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would
not be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a
very different affair. How many brave cavalry soldiers have been the
victims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was a
little more trouble to carry than a saber!
The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the
state which shall take the lead in making them will secure great
advantages. There is little left to be desired in artillery; but the
offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the
attention of a provident government.
The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great
revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alone
will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios
and Cæsars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the
nature of the arms and the organization of the troops.
The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful
rapidity.[2] The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it
is said the Austrians can now regulate,–the shrapnel howitzers, which
throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet,–the Perkins
steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,–will
multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau,
Borodino, Leipsic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the
European races.
If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these
inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the
half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture
with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be
obliged to resume its armor of the Middle Ages, without which a
battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy.
We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor,
and horses also will require the same protection.
While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is,
however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which
should lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused
by Napoleon. We will recur to this in the chapter on Tactics.
We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the
military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government.
1. The prince should receive an education both political and military.
He will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils
than good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the
latter himself.
2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his
first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. He
must confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the
general most capable of directing his armies.
3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable
footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by
reserves, which should always be prepared. Its instruction and
discipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization;
its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, and
superior if possible.
4. The matériel of war should also be upon the best footing, and
abundant. The reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals.
National jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all
improvements in this matériel made in other countries.
5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be
encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. The scientific
military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of
securing for the army men of merit and genius.
6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors
preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should
be furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with all
statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and
papers for the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chief
of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanently
stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should be
simply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secret
department for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns of
the corps.
7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography
and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their
material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the
strategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished officers should
be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they
acquit themselves with marked ability.
8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an
entire plan of operations,–which is always impossible,–but a system of
operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well
as all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the
enterprise.
9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the
war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the
country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of
the army or of the state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral and
material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring
into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable
alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties
during the war.
10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the
chances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute
to this condition the importance attached to it by Frederick the Great
in the history of his times. He was probably right at his epoch, when
armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last
crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well
organised money will no longer exercise the same influence,–at least
for one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money will procure
soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and
honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made
to support war. France, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the
enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which
cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its
efforts were none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports of
the cabinet of London, and particularly of M. d’Yvernois, announced that
France was about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had
200,000,000 francs[3] in the vaults of the Tuileries, all the while
meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies.
A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very
badly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the
strongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the
scales of military strength. Still, we must admit that a happy
combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of
well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts
to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of
sustaining a long war.
A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which
a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron,
and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. This
result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of
the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing
resources to an assailant.
We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are
not directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for our
purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be
for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and
localities may make in these relations.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 2: It will be recollected that the author wrote this many
years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been
attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery, which
he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important
improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less
marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no
civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for
depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.--TRANSLATORS.]
[Footnote 3: There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall
of Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous
efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811.]
ARTICLE XIV.
The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over Operations.
Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by
the monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain
that if the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, or
Napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of
performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would
be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country.
As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more
fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince,
(which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will
only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other
respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who
is himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that he
is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much
by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public
resources for the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerful
accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be
devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his
enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the
execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and
in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to
induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and
the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess no
military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily
influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good
results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. Each one will
present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience
necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his
judgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with and
opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even
if he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might
accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the
contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case his
presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to
great embarrassment. If the army were turned and cut off from its
communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad
results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at
head-quarters!
When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his
armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme
direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the
Prussian government with Blücher,–viz.; he should be accompanied by two
generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability,
the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity be
harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army
of Silesia in 1813.
The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it
proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has
frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred
that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser,
who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with
the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward
with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme at the battle of Audenarde, and, I
think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is
deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known
that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity
than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret
authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and
allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill
and courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor.
If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles,
he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full
selection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the same
titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of
the staff, and another general distinguished for his talent in
execution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of these
counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation.
We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in
person, his most important duty will be to have the position of
commander well filled,–which, unfortunately, is not always done.
Without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the
more modern examples under Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince
Eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the
ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. After
Louvois’ death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places of
Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermont
succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in the
Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon’s preference for
mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough
to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational
nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an
influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the
prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services.
But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be
profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will
be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a
judicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a skillful general
requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a
military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be
guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper
influence of cliques. The embarrassment is certainly less when there is
at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of
the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained
a battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it is not
always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the
government. It may well happen that after a long period of peace, there
may not be a single general in Europe who has commanded in chief. In
this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better
than another. Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of
their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this
position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it?
Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their
subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not
astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their
appropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled by
appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be
deceived in his selections.
One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in
realizing the beautiful fiction of Fénélon in Telemachus, by finding a
faithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between the
prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his
more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in
reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their
character and abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield to
personal affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was
rejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all
the art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed
so much luster upon the Russian arms.
It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing
could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a Cæsar, when he was
ignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparte
at the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by two
directors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public
sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises
and the experience of events.
The most essential qualities for a general will always be as
follow:–First, _A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions_;
Secondly, _A physical courage which takes no account of danger_. His
scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned
characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It
is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. His
knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be
perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Next
in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is
gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others
instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit
conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even
pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to
merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are
always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of
little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing
that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the
glory of its success, even when least entitled to it.
The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to
assign to the command a general of long experience in service with
troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little
experience in the management of troops. It is beyond question that war
is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be
able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment
against an enemy. Peter the Great, Condé, Frederick, and Napoleon are
instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the
staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will
not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that
he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural
genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. So, also, a
general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of
conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this question
does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or
negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of
the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to
a rational conclusion:–
1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery,
who has commanded a division or a corps d’armée, will, with equal
chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one
arm or special corps.
2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war,
will be equally fitted for the command.
3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a
commander-in-chief.
Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the
requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the
principles of the art of war.
The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the
formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may
advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the
operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of
organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction
into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal.
Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never
thought it would lead to the “right shoulder forward” of General
Ruchel,[4] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible
rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step
from the sublime to the ridiculous!
Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and
his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man
of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice
of the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a
general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit
him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous;
for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or
fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. The
best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of
several designated officers, all of undoubted ability.
It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent
councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more
weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if
the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find
in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of
the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be
expected from operations conducted by others than those who have
originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation
which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his
own conception?
I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and
no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than
myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is
absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military
officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to
accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount
of dissent.
What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon
proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the
maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded
them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand
difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting
them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been
executed by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved
failures?
In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be
useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case
they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition,
may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use
every means to insure the success of the movement. This is the only
advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply
consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this
harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce
unfortunate results.
Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of
organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by
experience, is–
1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight,
and of unshaken firmness in danger.
2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and
faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect
harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to
the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Blücher,
aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would
not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command
is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon,
a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great
general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system.
Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of
influencing military operations–viz.: that of a council of war at the
seat of government–deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed
from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also,
from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and
saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he
repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at
fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot
individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of
war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the
duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been
but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this
opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to
decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this
connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of
operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the
campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give
battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should
determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations,
whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to
these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the
levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points,
it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and
ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be
limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march
to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate
the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the
unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole
responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those
who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of
directing the army,–a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the
scene of operations.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 4: General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could
save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in
order to form an oblique line.]
ARTICLE XV.
The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies.
The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army
would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a
military spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London,
situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets,
that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military
decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and
habits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner
or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic
virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the
Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these
virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor
as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls,
the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that
whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither
neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of
industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they
should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the
strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and
heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for,
whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront
death in the footsteps of the Cæsars than to fatten upon the public
miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit.
Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the
tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public
estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life,
health, or fortune to the defense of his country.
The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army
with all possible social and public consideration. The second means is
to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state,
in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the
government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a
qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military
institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject
worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to
contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare
against the employment of officers of the army in other public
functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important
offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public employments
demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the
abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would
prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession
of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers
retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would
it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not
lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than
in the theaters and public clubs?
It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to
the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high
military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient
to place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was the
early practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were
bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea
that they were to die by their standards. Even the English–so jealous
of their rights–contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for
the whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting for
twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. In such armies, and
in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be
advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but
where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people,
the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a previous
military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public
employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military
spirit,–particularly in this age, when the attainment of material
comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people.
However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of
government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in
order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under
the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering
insult and dependency.
It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people,
but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Of
what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be
regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are
wanting? The forces would be numerous but without valor.
The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite
different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce
the same effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of a
temporary character,–of a political or religious nature, for instance,
or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the
skill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, is
more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the
object of the attention of every far-seeing government.[6] Courage
should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank
respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions
rather than in external forms only.
The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and
faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is
possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is
more honorable than enthusiasm in success,–since courage alone is
necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a
difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always
opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet
with a reward equal to that given for a great victory.
By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation
in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over
their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a
love for great exploits,–in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by
every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage,
punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,–we may expect to maintain
a high military spirit.
Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: those
formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in
the times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them too
heavy in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was
lost.
I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for
the enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if he
encounter an obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes’
troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would
contend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians.
The officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics
which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled
by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the
surest hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundred
thousand Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at
Kagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly
charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they
fought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army seized with
panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder
is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals
becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no
maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no
resource but in ignominious flight.
Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics;
and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy
it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never
been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind
which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which
pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle
of Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon’s infantry after
the victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still
more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen
hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two
days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most
vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history.
Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes
more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those
who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken.
In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others.
The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal
degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the
soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity
of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder:
the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of
precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order
contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference of
most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the
slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments
or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the
rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a
momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were
offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still,
the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be
powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree
obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions.
There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient
for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the
soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and
when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize
them,–which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out these
exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for
rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not
in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it.
It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired to
trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which
are purely military.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 5: For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers
from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all
colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. The
most venal deputies will not be those from military life.]
[Footnote 6: It is particularly important that this spirit should
pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable,
and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.]
